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Abstract
This article argues that a fundamental question, "What is free trade?," lurks behind the ongoing
debate about the relationship between international trade law and competing legal regimes. It also
lurks behind much of the confusion in the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
under the United States constitution, sometimes mentioned as a model for international trade law.
Yet, the literature has remarkably little to say about free trade's definition, although it contains
volumes about the reasons for free trade.
This article explores three possible concepts of free trade, trade free from discrimination against
foreign companies, trade free from coercion, and trade free from restraint, i.e. laissez-faire, primarily
in the context of trade and environment disputes. Only free trade defined as trade free of
discrimination offers a legitimate conception of free trade that the World Trade Organization
(WTO) can credibly administer. The misunderstandings between environmentalists and free
traders reflect trade law's tendency to amalgamate the anti-discrimination, anti-coercion, and
laissez-faire concepts. Free traders tend to think of trade law as primarily aimed at policing
discrimination, while environmentalists tend to think of it as aimed at laissez-faire, the least
legitimate concept. The trade law provides some support for both views. Indeed, prominent trade
and environment cases combine holdings moving toward laissez-faire and anti-coercion concepts
with dicta disavowing any such move.
Recognizing the conceptual question lurking behind "trade and" debates opens up the possibility
of thinking about the debates as searches for an appropriate definition of free trade. Until now,
most scholarship on the subject has treated these debates as a search for the scope of permissible
exceptions to free trade, assuming (wrongly) that "free trade" has a simple agreed upon meaning.
A concept of free trade as trade free from discrimination will only appear legitimate if the definition
of discrimination is reasonably intelligible. The WTO has used a very ad hoc approach to
discrimination. This article develops a concept of bright line discrimination to show that a more
coherent approach is at least possible. Adoption of bright line discrimination would require some
narrowing of the scope of free trade in order to enhance its legitimacy.
The search for an appropriate definition of free trade is absolutely central to making progress in
understanding "trade and" debates. This article seeks to spark a debate about this neglected
question.
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Introduction
A large literature addresses relationships between free trade and other policy areas that trade
law increasingly affects, including environmental law,1 intellectual property,2 labor relations,3 human
rights,4 and competition policy.5 These materials rarely include a precise definition of "free trade."6
1

See e.g. DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING

THE

GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT

AND THE F UTURE (1994); T RADE AND THE E NVIRONMENT: T HE L AW, E CONOMICS, AND
POLICY (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds. 1993)[hereinafter TRADE &
ENVIRONMENT]; C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS (1994).

See e.g. Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights in the North American Free Trade Agreement: A
Successful Case of Regional Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 817 (1993); Special Issue, Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 497 (1998).
2

See e.g. Virginia Leary, Workers Rights and
International Trade, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 175 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds. 1996) [hereinafter, FAIR TRADE].
3

See e.g. James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A
Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793 (1994); Patricia
Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement
Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to
the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1
(1996).
4

See e.g. Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and
Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997).
5

6

Most of the materials cited in this article contain no
definition of free trade. Tom Walthen defines free as “the
unlimited exchange of commerce between buyers and sellers
across national borders.” Tom Walthen, A Guide to Trade and
Environment, in TRADE & ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 5. He then
states that “free trade . . . does not necessarily. . .
require the elimination of” regulations, because it aims only
to avoid discrimination against “foreign companies.” Id.
Similarly, Steve Charnovitz rejects a laissez-faire definition
of trade and suggests that it involves the absence of tariffs
1

They do not answer a crucial question, what precisely must trade be free of in order to be "free" rather
than inappropriately shackled? This article addresses that question.
Instead of defining free trade, scholars seem to assume that “free trade” has an obvious
(although unspecified) meaning.7 Decisions interpreting the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)8 and academic writing use vague phrases like “trade barriers,”9 “trade restrictions,”10 and

and “special
border restrictions,” both of which are usually
discriminatory. See Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade,
Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 459,
471-72 (1994). This article addresses the tension implicit in
free trade under a laissez-faire definition and a more limited
definition focusing upon non-discrimination.
See e.g. ESTY, supra note 1, at 3, 33-35 (discussing,
but not defining free trade); FAIR TRADE, supra note 3 (same).
Cf. Brian Alexander Langille, General Reflections on the
Relationship of Trade and Labor (Or Fair Trade is Free Trade's
Destiny), in 2 id. at 236 (questioning the "assumption that
there is a natural or noncontroversial mode of economic
ordering" which trade theory can police); Donald H. Regan, The
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1097 (1986)
(explaining that the ambiguity of the phrase "free trade"
encourages conflating opposition to protectionism with a
commitment to laissez-faire).
7

8

October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
See Jagdish Bhagwati, Introduction in I FAIR TRADE, supra
note 3, at 1 (referring to the "simple elimination of trade
barriers").
9

See e.g. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal
Restraints on Domestic Environmental Regulations, in II FAIR
TRADE, supra note 3, at 64.
10

2

“protectionism,”11 to describe that which trade should be free of. But these phrases, absent
clarification, may be broad enough to collectively embrace almost any regulation or commercial tax
serving competing values, as demonstrated below. 12
This failure to articulate a normatively attractive and clear legal concept of free trade leaves the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the administrator of the GATT and related multilateral trade
agreements,13 unable to defend its legitimacy in a convincing manner.14 Increasing tension between the
WTO and other legal regimes has made the question of the WTO's legitimacy quite salient.15 Decisions

See e.g. id. at 75 (noting that it would have been easy
to find U.S. corporate average fuel economy standards
“protectionist”); VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW &
POLICY 44 (1995) (the controversy surrounding the use of
environmental trade measures (ETM) "centers on the possibility
of a state imposing an ETM as a protectionist measure."). Cf.
Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of
International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1999)(providing
a definition for this otherwise vague term).
11

Cf. Regan, supra note 7, at 1094-95 (defining
protectionism and not using it as a synonym for "trade
restrictions" or "trade barriers."); Sykes, supra note 11, at
3-7 (clarifying “protectionism”).
12

13

The relevant agreements are set out in Annexes to the
agreement establishing the WTO. Marakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994,
art. II, reprinted in GATT SECRETARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 6-7 (1994)
[hereinafter URUGUAY RESULTS]. The annexes themselves appear in
this same volume. See id. at 19-439.
On the concept of legitimacy see THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); Martti Kokenniemi, Book
Review, 86 AM J. INT'L L. 175 (1992).
14

See Kenneth W. Abbott, Economic Issues and Political
Participation: The Evolving Boundaries of International
15

3

holding environmental and public health regulations contrary to GATT have contributed to paralyzing
division among WTO member governments and triggered a campaign by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to stop new trade talks.16
A decade that witnessed the WTO's creation and a significant expansion of international trade
law17 has brought the WTO into conflict with international and domestic environmental law.18 During

Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 975 (1996)(pointing out risk
of trade regimes losing legitimacy and public support unless
noneconomic interests have a role in WTO policy and dispute
settlement); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and": Recent
Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship-And Their
Surprising Political Implications, 17 NORTHWESTERN J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 759, 764-768 (1996-97) (expansion of trade law into "new
substantive areas threatens to undermine international and
domestic support for the trade regime"); Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
Resolving Trade-Environment Conflicts: The Case for Trading
Institutions, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 607 (1994)(arguing against
allowing GATT to settle trade and environment disputes);
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, 19 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 347 (1998)(arguing that “linkage issues” raise
serious practical and theoretical challenges to the trade
regime).
See NGOs From 60 Countries Team Up to Halt Next WTO
Round on Environmental Grounds, 22 Int'l Envt. Rep. (BNA) 446
(May 26, 1999); A Global Disaster, THE ECONOMIST at 19, December
11, 1999.
16

See The Beef Over Bananas, THE ECONOMIST at 65, March 6,
1999 (the WTO has "dealt with 163 disputes since the WTO was
set up in 1995"); Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedure, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 21 (1999)(growth
in legal obligations from WTO administered trade law explains
"substantially all" of the increased case load).
17

18

See generally ESTY, supra note 1.
4

this decade, the WTO became increasingly concerned with "non-tariff trade barriers."19 This creates
enormous potential for conflict, because, in a globally integrated world, most regulations and
commercial taxes might be described as non-tariff trade barriers, since they burden commercial activity,
some of which is international.
In the early 1990s, two GATT panels held the unilateral imposition of a ban on tuna imports
caught in a manner that unduly endangers dolphins contrary to GATT.20 More recently, WTO dispute
resolution panels held an import restriction aimed at protecting endangered sea turtles contrary to
GATT and a European ban on the sale of beef injected with growth hormones contrary to the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS),21 another WTO administered trade
agreement.22 A stream of articles and books addressing the proper relationship between free trade and
environmental protection followed the “Tuna/Dolphin” decisions, but rarely addressed the definition of

19

See Langille, supra note 7, at 235.

See U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, September 3,
1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993)(unadopted);
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement
Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
33 I.L.M. 839 (1994)(unadopted).
20

21

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in URUGUAY
RESULTS, supra note 13, at 69 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
See Report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, October 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118
(1999); Report of the Appellate Body: EC Measures Concerning
Meat And Meat Products (Hormones), 1998 WL 25520.
22

5

free trade.23
This inattention to first principles may reflect the formal legal structure of GATT, which imposes
a set of trade disciplines upon contracting parties, rather than explicitly requiring free trade (whatever
that is). Nevertheless, free trade provides the normative justification for the WTO and the agreements
it administers, and, as this article shows, concepts of free trade sometimes help explain the results of
cases interpreting trade agreements. Hence, an adequate legal concept of free trade would greatly
enhance the debate about the WTO.
An analysis of possible definitions shows that the ad hoc and uncertain nature of trade law

See Frank J. Garcia, The Trade Linkage Phenomenon:
Pointing the Way to the Trade Law and Global Social Policy of
the 21st Century, 2 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 201, 202 n.3 (1998)
(tuna/dolphin decisions widely believed to have spurred public
opposition to the WTO and concern with linkage issues); Thomas
J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM
J. INT'L L. 268, 268 (1997)(Tuna/Dolphin I produced an
"explosion of rhetoric" in "learned journals"). See e.g. ESTY,
supra note 1; TRADE & ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1; Mark Edward
Foster, Note, Trade and Environment: Making Room for
Environmental Trade Measures within the GATT, 71 S. CAL. L.
REV. 393 (1998) (arguing that the
WTO should consider environmental trade measures legal under
GATT Article XX); Annick Emmenegger Brunner, Conflicts Between
International Trade and Multilateral Environmental Agreements,
4 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMP. LAW 74 (1997); Chris Wold,
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT: Conflict
and Resolution, 26 ENVTL. L. 841 (1996); Howard F. Chang, An
Economic analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global
Environment, 83 GEO. L. J. 2131 (1995); Charnovitz, supra note
6; Steve Charnovitz, Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and
Their Application to Environmental Trade Measures, 7 TUL.
ENVTL. L. J. 299 (1994); Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and
Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A Commentary,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1992).
23

6

stems from a failure to choose a clear, limited, and coherent concept of free trade from among the
available alternatives, rather than from theoretical necessity.24 Current trade law amalgamates three
different ideas about what trade should be free of. Article III of GATT’s text reflects a concept of free
trade as trade free of laws, both taxes and regulations, that discriminate between foreign and
domestically produced goods.25 But, this article will argue, the Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle
decisions implicitly rely upon an anti-coercion concept of free trade - as trade unimpeded by efforts to
enforce even non-discriminatory environmental law (or other bodies of non-trade law) against noncomplying nations.26 The WTO took a step toward an even broader concept of free trade, as trade
free of national regulation - a broad laissez-faire concept, when it adopted the SPS agreement during

See WTO Committee Report Claims Success in Furthering
Trade, Environment Talks, 21 INT. ENVT. REP. 1127, 1128
(November 11, 1998)[hereinafter UNEP Criticism](citing United
Nations Environment Program's charge that uncertainty in
international trade law "may have hampered several
environmental conventions."). Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E.
Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1404
(1994) (arguing that "lack of clarity may be a necessary
characteristic" of law addressing free trade).
24

See Farber & Hudec, supra note 24, at 1406
(characterizing free trade policy as a principle of
evenhandedness); Dunoff, Rethinking, supra note 15, at 370-72.
25

26

I use the term "coercion" with some reservations.
Trade measures do not in fact force foreign nations to change
their conduct as a military invasion or the arrest of a person
might. See Belinda Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and
Environmental Protection Policies, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 751, 755
(1993). On the other hand, trade measures involve more force
than negotiation. Id.
7

the Uruguay round of trade negotiations.27
Since trade law conflates three different ideas of what free trade is, trade law appears quite ad
hoc and difficult to justify. Because these ideas are not equal in their normative attractiveness and their
implications for other legal regimes, free trade becomes something of Rohrsach test. Commerce fans
tend to identify free trade with the most normatively appealing idea, that of non-discrimination, and
environmentalists tend to identify it with the least normatively appealing idea, laissez-faire government.
Part one of this article begins by identifying the roots of the ambiguity in the legal concept of
free trade in the classical economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. It then develops three models
of free trade, a model based on the principal of non-discrimination, a model based on an international
non-coercion principle, and a model based on a principle of laissez-faire government. This part
describes the theoretical support for these models, identifies some of their sources in international trade
law, and elucidates their implications for focusing efforts to expand free trade. It closes by using the
models to help explain why the concepts of “trade barriers” and “trade restrictions” cannot adequately
substitute for a definition of free trade.
Part two analyzes the legitimacy of WTO adjudication of each model’s key policy issues.28 It

See John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation
State and the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism,
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 916 (1996) (the competition for trade
resulting from GATT imposes limitations on national regulatory
power similar to those imposed upon "states in nineteenthcentury America.").
27

See generally At Daggers Drawn, THE ECONOMIST at 17, 20
(May 8, 1999) (questioning whether the WTO has the legitimacy
to arbitrate intensely political matters).
28

8

shows that application of these models yields fresh insights into the most important trade and
environment cases, helps explain continued misunderstandings between free traders and
environmentalists, and reframes the ongoing trade and environment debate. It concludes that an nondiscrimination model offers the most hope for advancing acceptance of the WTO beyond the world of
economists and trade specialists.
Part three will explore the implications of selecting an non-discrimination model. It explains that
the WTO must develop a reasonably consistent and convincing view of discrimination in order to gain
the legitimacy that the non-discrimination concept may bring. This part discusses why antiprotectionism does not provide a coherent legal concept. It also shows that attention to the problem of
defining free trade helps explain the incoherence of Supreme Court precedent under the dormant
commerce clause, which Professor Esty has proposed as a model for GATT. 29 It also develops a
narrow concept of bright-line discrimination to show that a more coherent definition of discrimination is
possible.
Much of the scholarly commentary about the trade and environment issue has framed the
debate as one about "exceptions" to free trade. The inquiry into the meaning of free trade invites more
critical thinking about the GATT and SPS trade disciplines themselves, not just the exceptions to GATT
disciplines. This article focuses on trade and environment issues in order to make the topic
manageable, but the analysis offered here will contribute to the broader "trade and" debate.
Hopefully, this article will spark further discussion about what free trade should be. In the long

See ESTY, supra note 1, at 111-118. Cf. Farber & Hudec,
supra note 24.
29
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run, this issue is critical to the WTO’s legitimacy.30
I. The Law and Theory Supporting the Non-Discrimination, International Non-Coercion, and
Laissez-Faire Models
The idea that the legal concept of free trade is ambiguous will surprise many economists, who
may assume that free trade has a clear uncontested meaning in economic theory. This part will show
that the ambiguity that the model identifies in the legal concept of free trade has its roots in the writings
of David Ricardo and Adam Smith.31 It will then sketch out the three models and their sources.
A. Classical Roots of the Ambiguity
Economists write volumes about the reasons for "free trade," but often say very little about its
definition.32 Adam Smith in "The Wealth of Nations" advanced the argument that efforts to protect a
See generally McGinnis, supra note 27, at 918-924
(explaining why the regime of "international federalism" may
be unstable because "interest groups" may oppose laissez-faire
policies); Abbott, supra note 15, at 975 (pointing out risk of
trade regimes losing legitimacy and public support unless
noneconomic interests have a role in WTO policy and dispute
settlement); Dunoff, supra note 15, at 764 (expansion of trade
law into "new substantive areas threatens to undermine
international and domestic support for the trade regime");
Daniel Esty, Linkages and Governments: NGOs at the World
Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 709, 715
(1998)(questioning WTO legitimacy to make regulatory
judgments).
30

See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Modern Library 1994);
DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION, IN I
THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO (1962).
31

See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
OF F REE T RADE (1996)(describing a history of debates about free
trade’s merits, rather than its definition). See e.g. PAUL R.
KRUGMAN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1990)(theories about why
international trade exists, the effects of "protectionism" and
optimal trade policy, building in insights about economies of
32

10

country's producers by banning or levying high tariffs upon imports would not only harm the nation
making the taxed or banned goods, but also the nation imposing the restriction.33 David Ricardo
refined Smith's insights into a more nuanced theory of comparative advantage.34 The theory holds that
free trade would allow each country to make that which it is best suited to make, thereby increasing
world wide production and lowering costs.35 This theory articulates the reasons for free trade.36
Smith and Ricardo's work have less to say about what exactly free trade is. Smith's theories
constitute an extended argument against the mercantilist system of his day.37 This system levied high
protective tariffs or banned imports outright as an economic strategy.38 Smith's work showed that this
strategy was economically counterproductive.39
The dominant view of Smith’s and Ricardo’s work holds that it articulates a laissez-faire theory
of free trade.40 Their work provides some support for this view. Smith, for example, characterizes his

scale).
33

See SMITH, supra note 31, at 485-86.

34

See RICARDO, supra note 31, at 128-149.

35

Id. at 133-34.

36

For a brief review of the theory as it has evolved to
date see Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the
Normative Economics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 49 (1998).
37

See SMITH, supra note 31, at 456-480.

38

Id. at 479.

39

See id. at 481-502.

See e.g. DANIEL R. FUSFELD, THE AGE OF THE ECONOMIST 22-56
(1968); ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN PERSPECTIVE: A BOOK OF READINGS 69-70(Jerry
40
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endorsement of the navigation acts (trade restrictions to advance national security) and compensatory
taxation (taxation of imports compensating for other country’s taxation of exports) as "limitations" upon
the principle of free trade.41 Similarly, Ricardo discusses a "system of perfectly free commerce"
implying trade with no burdens whatever.42 This suggests that the free trade principle really involved
absolute license to trade without any impediments or restrictions. This would imply no commercial
taxes or regulations, at least upon goods traded internationally and the processes produce such goods.
Analysis of Smith's policy recommendations, however, shows that they fit a model of nondiscrimination in trade relations better than they fit a laissez-faire model. The import bans and high
protective tariffs that Smith opposed discriminated against imports, since they applied to imports, but
not to competing domestic industry. Smith endorsed compensatory taxation and general taxation for
legitimate public purposes, positions at odds with strict laissez-faire, but consistent with antidiscrimination.43
Ricardo's work focuses more on the mechanics of comparative advantage and less on policy
recommendations. Since he does not adamantly oppose taxes, Ricardo too does not really endorse
laissez-faire in a strict sense either. In discussing taxes upon produce, for example, he states that "the

Combee and Edgar Norton eds., 1991); ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE
WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES, TIMES, AND IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMIC
THINKERS (4TH ed. 1970).
See id. at 494 (describing compensatory taxation as
"the second limitation of the freedom of trade")
41

See RICARDO, supra note 31, at 133. Cf. id. at 318, 338
(referring to "universally free trade" and "free trade"
respectively)
42

43

See

SMITH,

supra note 31, at 494-496, 790, 876.
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sum required by the taxes must be raised."44 He then claims that a produce tax would not "materially
interfere with foreign trade."45 At the same time, he strikes a laissez-faire note in stating that the tax
"would . . . prevent the very best distribution of the capital of the whole world. . ."46 On balance, he
treats taxation as necessary, not as a trade restraint to be abolished.
This analysis reveals a problem with the classical foundation for free trade. A principle different
from the laissez-faire principal that Smith and Ricardo are known for best accounts for their policies.
This problem matters a great deal for legal theory, because a definition of free trade must help guide
institutional policy decisions to function as a useful legal concept.
Either a laissez-faire or a non-discrimination principle justifies abandonment of mercantilist
policies, which involve discriminatory government activism. The ambiguity, therefore, mattered little to
the argument against mercantilism.
The two concepts, however, diverge sharply in their implications for modern environmental and
health regulations. And Smith and Ricardo, not surprisingly, have little to say about modern regulation
that addresses health and environmental concerns.
Neoclassical economic principles would suggest that the benefits of environmental and health
regulations should equal their costs.47 This, however, seems like a concept of welfare economics,

44

RICARDO, supra note 31, at 167.

45

Id. at 172.

46

Id. at 172.

See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of
Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 577-579 (1997); E. J. MISHAN, COST47
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rather than a definition of free trade.48 In addition, application of this principle poses
numerous practical and theoretical problems.49
This summary suggests two possible definitions of free trade. One might think of free trade as
trade free of burdens, a broad laissez-faire principle. One might, on the other hand, think of free trade
as trade free of discrimination.

B. GATT Article III: Trade Free from Discrimination
Since its negotiation in1947, GATT has formed the basis for international trade law.50

BENEFIT

ANALYSIS

48

154-61 (1982).

See generally MISHAN, supra note 47.

See e.g. Driesen, supra note 47 (administrative costbenefit analysis does not help evaluate most important
economic questions about cost or accomplish any of the other
goals proponents have outlined); DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER,
ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES & THE ENVIRONMENT at 122-23
(1990)(noting temptation to "downgrade" environmental benefits
because they are "soft" variables); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING
RATIONALITY: T HE R OLE OF R EGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE F EDERAL B UREAUCRACY
(1996); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988) (arguing that
environmental policies should be based on ethical, esthetic,
cultural and historical consideration rather than aggregate
personnel preferences); Duncan Kennedy, Cost Benefit Analysis
of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387
(1981) (outcomes of CBA indeterminate in theory); Lawrence A.
Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
66, 70 (1972) (same).
49

On its status under U.S. domestic law see John H.
Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United
States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 250 (1967); C. O'Neal
Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 Vand.
J. Transnat'l L. 243 n. 160 (1997); Uruguay Round Agreement
50
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Currently, some 133 countries have agreed to abide by the GATT agreement.51
GATT article III supports “free trade,” defined as trade free of discrimination against foreign
goods as a tool of economic policy. 52 Article III read in isolation would suggest that GATT seeks to
facilitate international trade - and thereby spread prosperity - by establishing a principle of nondiscrimination against foreign goods.53 GATT’s preamble and its trade liberalization program
emphasize non-discrimination.54 The WTO provides a forum for lowering tariffs, taxes that apply to

Act of Dec. 8, 1994, P.L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 3511-3512 (approving GATT and the Uruguay Round
agreement, but providing that these agreements do not amend
federal laws protecting workers, the environment, and health
and safety).
Andrew L. Strauss, From Gattzilla to the Green Giant:
Winning the Environmental Battle for the Soul of the World
Trade Organization, 19 U PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 769, 815 (1998).
This figure includes countries who assented to GATT prior to
the formation of the WTO and those who subsequently became
members of the WTO.
51

John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental
Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227,
1231 (1992).
52

See Farber & Hudec, supra note 10, at 108 (claiming
that GATT has “made a major contribution to alleviating
poverty in the postwar era.”); Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal
Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign
Environmental Practices in II FAIR TRADE, supra note 3 ("The
GATT's economic goal is to promote, through liberal
international trade policies, the greater effectiveness of
national economies.").
53

See GATT, supra note 8 preamble. The preamble speaks
of the "elimination of discriminatory treatment" [emphasis
added], but only the "substantial reduction" of trade barriers
generally.
54
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imports but not domestically produced goods.55 WTO member governments commit themselves to the
principle of "national treatment" for imports, a requirement that taxes and regulations not discriminate
between foreign and domestic goods absent an adequate non-economic justification. 56 Members must
provide other GATT contracting parties with the same treatment they provide the "most-favored" nation
with which they trade, a limited principle of non-discrimination between foreign trading partners.57
Although GATT’s text lacks a definition of discrimination, a working definition will help clarify
the model. One might define discrimination as imposition of a standard or restriction on imports that
one does not impose upon one's nationals.58 A concept of free trade as trade free of discrimination
against foreign producers implies a focus upon tariff reduction, elimination of regulations and taxes that
expressly discriminate between foreign and domestic goods, termination of subsidies that apply to only
domestic manufacturers of products (thereby discriminating against imports), and abolition of import
quotas.59

See id.(citing substantial reduction of tariffs as a
reason the parties to GATT have agreed to it); GATT, supra
note 8 XXVIIIbis (providing for negotiation of tariff
reductions). Under the auspices of the WTO, the parties to
GATT periodically negotiate schedules that reduce tariffs,
which constitute an integral part of the GATT agreement.
55

56

Id. arts. III, XX.

57

Id. art. I.

58

I posit this simple model as a means of framing
discussion of free trade's meaning. This model does not
capture every feature of GATT.
See generally, THE URUGUAY ROUND & BEYOND 255 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds. 1998)(advocating elimination of
subsidies for coal production).
59
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C. The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, Article XI, and Article XX’s
Evisceration: The Laissez-Faire Model
One can define free trade more broadly than trade free of discrimination. We might mean by
free trade, trade unencumbered by national laws that might increase prices, such as taxes and
regulation.60
GATT Article XI:1 offers the potential for a substantial move toward laissez-faire government.
Article XI generally prohibits “quantitative restrictions” upon exports or imports. One might construe
this article narrowly to embrace import quotas and little else, rendering it consistent with a nondiscrimination principle. But the WTO has interpreted it broadly to apply to any border measure
imposing any burden upon international trade.61 This implies that any violation of the laissez-faire
principle administered at the border offends GATT Article XI:1.
While article XI in isolation would go far toward establishing a laissez-faire concept, the note ad
article III should limit article XI’s push toward laissez-faire. Trade experts agree that the note ad article
III acts as a defense to claims that product regulations applied at the border are per se violations of
article XI.62 It subjects such regulations to article III’s national treatment obligation in lieu of the rule of
Cf. Regan, supra note 7, at 1096 (distinguishing being
against protectionism from being in favor of total economic
laissez-faire).
60

See WTO Dispute Settlement Report on India-Quantitative
Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile & Industrial
Products, April 6, 1999, 1999 WTO DS Lexis 5, ¶ 5.142
(construing article XI to include “a limitation on action . .
. condition or regulation.”).
61

See e.g. Robert E. Hudec, The Product-Process Doctrine
in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence at 5 (1999)(unpublished manuscript
on file with the author).
62
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per se invalidity that generally applies to trade restrictions under article XI.63 Hence, the scope of
article III and its ad note determines the limits that apply to article XI”s push toward laissez-faire
government.
GATT contains a set of defenses in Article XX that arguably reflects a conscious choice to
leave decisions about the appropriate scope of national regulation to advance at least citizens’ noncommercial welfare to national governments.64 These defenses, assuming that they have meaning,
would allow a country to impose otherwise GATT illegal trade restrictions when they meet Article
XX’s requirements.65 In other words, article XX would allow quantitative restrictions on trade and
discriminatory regulation of foreign commerce under some circumstances. These exceptions apply to
environmental laws.66
Trade panels, however, have usually construed these provisions very narrowly. 67 As a result,
63

See id.

64

GATT, art. XX.

See U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, September 3,
1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155, ¶ 5.27
(1993)(unadopted)[hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I].
65

See GATT, art. XX(b),(g); Steve Charnovitz, Exploring
the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. WORLD
TRADE 37 (1991); WTO Report of the Appellate Body on U.S.
Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
October 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118, ¶¶ 127-34 (1999) [hereinafter
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate](article XX applies to efforts to
protect endangered species).
66

See Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and
Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted on November 7, 1990,
B.I.S.D. 36S/200 ¶¶ 74-75 (using a least restrictive means
test under article XX); Tuna/Dolphin I ¶¶ 5.28, 5.33 (same);
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement
67

18

no panel has ever upheld a health or environmental regulation under an article XX defense.68 While
GATT does not expressly embrace a laissez-faire philosophy, the evisceration of article XX defenses
makes it quite difficult to identify meaningful limits to a WTO panel’s ability to pursue a broad laissezfaire agenda indirectly.
The Shrimp/Turtle case rejected a very broad anti-coercion rationale that might automatically
eliminate any possibility of an article XX defense.69 But this decision struck down the measure before it

Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
33 I.L.M. 839, ¶ 5.35 (1994)[hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II
¶](unadopted)(same); Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, adopted on March 22, 1988,
B.I.S.D. 35S/98 ¶ 4.7 (same); Charnovitz, supra note 66, at
49-50 (showing why this test is difficult to meet); Farber &
Hudec, supra note 10, at 81 (recognizing that “it is always
possible to imagine some less restrictive alternative,” but
arguing that GATT tribunals have in practice exercised “good
judgment and common sense in this exercise.”); Steve
Charnovitz, Pelly Amendments, supra note 120, at 778-79
(contrasting a literal approach the article XX’s chapeau with
the case law’s approach).
Charnovitz, Defogging, supra note 6, at 494. See WTO
Report of the Appellate Body on United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603, 618-23
(1996)[hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline] (eschewing a least
restrictive means type approach, but still finding law illegal
under article XX); Shrimp/Turtle Appellate, ¶¶ 135-42 (same).
See also Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National
Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 32 INT’L
LAWYER 619, 622 (1998) (interpretation of article XX has made
its requirements “exceptionally demanding.”).
68

69

The Appellate Body held erroneous the panel’s
conclusion that conditioning access to a market upon the
exporter’s compliance with the importer’s unilaterally
required policies necessarily violated article XX.
Shrimp/Turtle Appellate, ¶¶ 121-122. In so doing, it stated
that a per se rule against unilateral requirements might
19

and it is too soon to tell whether subsequent panels will allow article XX defenses to validate otherwise
GATT illegal environmental measures.70
Even if a government regulation complies with all relevant GATT trade disciplines or somehow
manages to satisfy the WTO’s interpretation of article XX, the recent SPS agreement invites WTO
panels to second guess national governments claims that the problem a regulation addresses warrants a
regulatory remedy.71 And a recent WTO panel decision did precisely that, declaring illegal a European
community restriction on beef from cattle injected with hormones, some of which had been found to
cause cancer in laboratory animals.72 A panel of trade experts with no expertise in public health

systematically make much of article XX “inutile.”

Id. ¶ 121.

70

In spite of the Appellate Body’s rejection of a general
rule against unilateral action, it cited the coercive effect
of the measure before it as its “most conspicuous flaw.” Id.
¶ 161. It then developed a novel and expansive concept of
discrimination in order to invalidate the measure under the
chapeau of article XX. Id. ¶¶ 161-186. The opinion suggests
that clear, simple, uniform requirements, cannot be imposed
unilaterally, but complicated discretionary judgments may be
permissible, at least if preceded by fruitless negotiations
and adequate administrative process. Id. This would call
into question a lot of existing law and raises critical
questions of administrative feasability. Also, it remains to
be seen whether subsequent panels will follow Shrimp/Turtle’s
approach or the more generally hostile approach of the
Tuna/Dolphin cases.
71

For background and a preliminary assessment of the SPS
agreement see Donna Roberts, Preliminary Assessment of the
Effects of the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Trade Regulations, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 377 (1998).
See Report of the Panel: EC
And Meat Products (Hormones), 1997
[hereinafter Beef/Hormone Panel].
that the WTO would declare illegal
72
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Measures Concerning Meat
WL 569984 (August 18, 1997)
This decision establishes
"sanitary" measures that

concluded that the European Community had failed to show that the banned hormones posed a
significant risk.73 The WTO's Appellate Body affirmed the Panel decision, while reversing some of its
subsidiary rulings.74
The new SPS agreement, as interpreted so far by the WTO, creates hurdles for governments
applying non-discriminatory, but strict standards, to protect public health. 75 Governments wishing to
enact stricter standards than existing advisory international standards must base their standards on a risk
assessment.76 WTO panels will scrutinize national regulations determine whether risk assessments

did not discriminate. The panel opinion states that WTO
panels may invalidate laws that fully comply with GATT's nondiscrimination principles, if they fail to comply with the
SPS. Id. ¶¶ 8.36-8.41.
See Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the
"World Trans-science Organization": Scientific Uncertainty,
Science Policy, and Fact-finding in the Growth Hormones
Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 251, 301-303, 308-309 (1998)
(discussing Panel fact-finding and the appellate body’s
approval of the findings).
73

See Report of the Appellate Body: EC Measures
Concerning Meat And Meat Products (Hormones), January 16,
1998, 1998 WL 25520 ¶ 253 (1998)[hereinafter, Beef/Hormone
Appellate].
74

See Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization,
Meat Hormones, and Food Safety, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
41, 1781 (1997). Cf. Ryan David Thomas, Note, Where's the
Beef? Mad Cows and the Blight of the SPS Agreement, 32 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487 (1999)(arguing that the SPS agreement does
not go far enough toward harmonizing regulatory measures).
75

Beef/Hormone Appellate ¶ 186. Cf. David A. Wirth,
International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for Regulatory
Reform, 1997 U.CHI. LEGAL FORUM 331, 339 n. 22 (questioning the
Beef/Hormone panel’s approach).
76
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"reasonably support" the regulatory measure at stake.77 The Beef/Hormone Appellate Body
acknowledged, in dicta, national governments' right to regulate on the basis of minority scientific
views.78 But it held that the single divergent opinion of a well respected scientist could not justify the
regulatory program before it, because the scientist did not himself carry out research directly addressing
hormone residues in beef fattened with hormones.79 It also apparently held that a government cannot
regulate carcinogens without scientific studies addressing the specific application of the carcinogen it
banned, at least in the face of studies of expert opinion finding the disputed application "safe."80
Finally, it rejected an apparently undisputed body of research identifying misapplication of growth
hormones as a problem. The Panel found the handful of studies on this issue "insufficient" to constitute
a risk assessment of that issue.81 This would suggest that governments cannot, under the SPS
agreement, permanently regulate any problem that has not been studied extensively, even when there is
little scientific controversy about it.
The Appellate Body stated in dicta that the SPS does not require quantification of risk.82 But
its holdings, both in Beef Hormone and subsequent cases, cast doubt on whether any measure based on

77

Beef/Hormone Appellate ¶ 193.

78

Id. ¶ 194.

79

Id. ¶ 198.

Id. ¶¶ 196, 199-200. See Walker, supra note 20, at 303
(faulting the Appellate Body for requiring an assessment so
specifically focused that the "risk determination itself must
clear a high threshold of specificity.").
80

81

Beef/Hormone Appellate ¶ 207.

82

Id. ¶¶ 187
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a qualitative assessment of limited information could pass muster.83
Article 5.7 of the SPS agreement does authorize provisional adoption of measures on the basis
of “available pertinent information.” No WTO panel has interpreted this language yet. But for reasons
set out in the margin, this provision may do very little to preserve regulatory programs.84
Judicial scrutiny of scientific justifications can cripple regulatory programs where great scientific
uncertainty exists.85 Because of ethical limitations on controlled human experimentation, precise data

See e.g. Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon, 1998 WL 731009, October 20, 1998 (reversing Panel
assumption that a document containing “some evaluation” of
risk is a risk assessment under the SPS agreement).
83

84

Most serious deficits in scientific understanding of
environmental problems last a very long time. This raises an
issue as to whether authority to “provisionally” adopt
measures on the basis of available information provides
authority to keep a measure in place for a long period of time
when information is lacking.
Furthermore, authority to regulate “on the basis of
available pertinent information” might be interpreted very
strictly to cripple the provision. A panel might construe
“pertinent” information narrowly to prohibit inferences from
information that only indirectly bears on the necessity for
the measure. It might also interpret the requirement for a
“basis” in available information to require a rather direct
relationship between the information and the precise
regulatory decision. When real data gaps exists, such
precision will often be impossible.
See Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural
Discretion in the Administrative Resolution of Science Policy
Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.
J. 729, 780 (1979) (no regulatory program is possible if it
must be based solely upon accepted "facts"); Wirth, supra note
76, at 343 (discussing the chilling effect judicial
application of science-based test may have upon regulation).
85
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about the effects of contaminants at all levels on human beings usually does not exist.86
In this context, burdens of proof can become critical. 87 Whichever party bears the burden of
proof in a case with very incomplete data has a good chance of losing.88
The WTO has placed the burden of proof on regulating governments. The Beef Hormone
Appellate Body reversed a Panel decision that imposed the burden of proof upon regulating
governments in all cases.89 But the Appellate Body's decision may still support regular application of
the burden of proof to regulators. The Appellate Body endorsed shifting the burden to the regulating
party once the complaining party establishes a prima facie violation of the SPS Agreement.90 While the
Appellate Body did not articulate a set of principles defining a prima facie violation, the case may
support finding a prima facie violation any time a bona fide scientific dispute exists about the relationship

See id. at 733-736 (explaining why direct data about
the effects of widespread exposure to low doses of
carcinogens is rarely available); Walker, supra note 75, at
258-261 (describing nature of some of the uncertainties in
risk assessment); David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the
Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.
J. 817, 837-840 (1994)(discussing uncertainty and the
precautionary principle); Wirth, supra note 76, at 340
(quantitative risk assessment involves the application of
policy choices to uncertain data).
86

87

Beef/Hormone Appellate ¶ 97 (issue of burden of proof
of particular importance).
See Walker, supra note 75, at 313 ("the party with the
burden of persuasion has a difficult burden of proof" because
of scientific uncertainty).
88

89

Beef/Hormone Appellate ¶¶ 99-108.

90

Id. ¶ 98.
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between a risk assessment and an adopted measure.91 Because such disputes are inevitable when little
direct data exists about human exposure at various levels (a very common situation), a prima facie case
of a violation may exist frequently.92
Subsequent WTO panels may regularly require regulators to affirmatively prove that specific
evidence directly supports their standards, rather than require complaining parties to show that
regulated substances are safe or showing some defense to government inferences from incomplete
data.93 If this occurs the SPS agreement could significantly impede regulation, because complete data
exists about very few potentially significant public health problems.94

91

The Appellate Body stated that its finding that the
burden of proof shifts upon finding a prima facie violation
"does not deal with the quite separate issue of whether the
United States actually made a prima facie case. . ." Id. ¶ 109
n. 71. The Appellate Body concluded that the United States
and Canada established a prima facie case, but did not explain
why. Id. ¶ 197 n. 180. See Walker, supra note 75, at 317
(it's not clear what generalizable definition of a prima facie
case emerges). The Appellate Body effectively treated a range
of scientific disputes as establishing a prima facie case.
92

A subsequent decision supports finding against a
regulating nation when the complaining nation has not made a
prima facie case. See Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, February 22, 1999, 1999 WL 83966, ¶¶ 109-114, 136137 (holding that Japan’s application of varietal testing
requirements to apricots, pears, plums, and quince conflicts
with the obligation to base measures on a risk assessment,
even though the United States made no prima facie case that
the measure lacked a scientific basis).
See Walker, supra note 75, at 318 (Appellate Body may
have required evidence "sufficiently specific and probative .
. . to overcome a presumption of no risk.").
93

See id. (Appellate Body may have placed a "substantial
burden indeed" upon defending countries); Wirth, supra note
94

25

In addition, the SPS agreement generally requires WTO members to use the least trade
restrictive means available to protect public health.95 This least restrictive means test also provides a
significant laissez-faire element.96
Defining free trade as trade free of government regulation and/or taxes would mean that efforts
to expand free trade should focus on weakening regulation and taxes designed to protect the public
health or advance other values that might compete with expanded sales of goods at lower prices.
Preliminary steps might involve creating burdens governments must meet in order to impose regulations
- precisely what the SPS agreement has done. While the WTO has not embraced laissez-faire

86, at 833 (science can inform the regulatory process, but
cannot
determine results with particularity); Roberts, supra note 71,
at 396-397 (discussing evidence that enunciation of the SPS
has prompted unilateral reconsideration of health protection
measures). Roberts, however, believes that fears that SPS
disciplines would occasion an "intolerable assault on . . .
food safety and environmental standards have likely been
overdrawn." Id. at 399. She cites the fact that most of the
disputes to date involve developed countries as support for
this view. Id. at 398-399. She does not explain why SPS
disciplines might not undermine food safety and environmental
standards in developed countries.
Prior to the Beef Hormone decision a number of scholars
believed that the SPS agreement did not interfere with
standard setting. See e.g. Schoenbaum, supra note 23, at 286.
Obviously, the Beef Hormone decision requires reevaluation of
these views.
95

SPS Agreement, supra note 21, art. 5.6.

See infra, at 108-110. Cf. Japan-Measures Affecting
Agricultural Products, ¶¶ 96-100, ¶ 126 (complaining party
must show that an alternative measure meets the level of
stringency desired by the regulating government to invoke the
last trade restrictive means test).
96
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government as an explicit goal, it has taken some substantial steps in that direction.97
D. The Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle Decisions: Trade Free from International
Coercion
Governments frequently employ trade restrictions for reasons other than protection of domestic
industry. International institutions usually lack coercive power to enforce international legal obligations.
Hence, national governments must generate solutions to international problems.
Governments generally seek to resolve disputes about a wide range of matters, including
national security, natural resource conservation, public health and safety, international trade, and human
rights, through negotiation. Negotiation does not always solve the problems it addresses and countries
may feel compelled to use various forms of coercion to achieve results.
Many countries employ trade restrictions instead of war when negotiation fails.98 Trade
restrictions have played an important role in the development of international law and in international
policy.
Trade sanctions have encouraged governments to further develop GATT, to become GATT

See Steve Charnovitz, Environment and Health Under WTO
Dispute Settlement, 32 Int'l Law. 901 (1998)(reviewing cases).
97

See Hudec, supra note 53, at 113 (trade restrictions
"seem to offer the right blend of coercion and civility" when
diplomacy fails). See e.g. Amy Blackwell, The Humane Society
and Italian Driftnetters: Environmental Activists and
Unilateral Action in International Law, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 313, 314-315 (1998) (explaining that the High Seas
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act prohibits imports of fish
from nations using driftnets because several countries have
not complied with U.N. resolutions calling for a moratorium on
driftnetting).
98
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contracting parties, and to comply with its terms.99 GATT reflects a specific decision to countenance
unilateral trade measures to encourage non-parties to undertake GATT commitments. GATT’s
drafters could have specified that GATT’s requirements apply to all goods that a GATT contracting
party imports. This would have required GATT contracting parties to persuade non-parties to sign
GATT through negotiation. But GATT requirements only apply to imports from GATT contracting
parties.100 Contracting parties remain free to restrict imports from non-parties. Hence, GATT’s
drafters deliberately decided to allow GATT contracting parties to restrict imports from non-parties,
instead of drafting a provision forbidding restrictions against any country’s exports.
This feature of GATT played an important role in its development. The possibility of imposition
of trade restrictions against non-parties coupled with the promise of escape through signature of GATT
induced many countries to become parties.
GATT contracting parties, however, may not always honor their GATT obligations. Hence, the
regime has needed an enforcement mechanism.
Prior to the recent creation of the WTO, GATT incorporated a dispute settlement process that

99

See Taylor, supra note 50.

100

Id. Article III provides for national treatment of
the "protects of the territory of any contracting party"
[emphasis added] upon import into the territory of another
contracting party. Id. Art. III. Similarly, article XI bars
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports from a
"contracting party."
Id. Art. XI. Hence, these disciplines apply only to those who
have contracted to abide by GATT.
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relied upon consensus adoption of dispute resolution panel decisions.101 As a result, the losing party
generally could block implementation of GATT panel decisions by simply opposing its adoption.102
The United States increased its reliance on unilateral trade restrictions to leverage favorable
resolution of trade disputes under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,103 in part, to address failures
to enforce GATT panel decisions.104 Partially in order to escape the pressures from unilateral
imposition of trade sanctions, GATT contracting parties agreed to create the WTO in 1994.105 Hence,
unilateral trade sanctions have played an important role not just in attracting new GATT contracting
parties, but also in securing international agreement to strengthen GATT enforcement.106

See Taylor, supra note 50, at 245-246; Steve
Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J.
INT'L L. 689, 719 (1998).
101

Hudec, supra note 53, at 9 (discussing defendant's veto
rights under GATT dispute settlement practice).
102

103

Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 301-310, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411-20 (1988)
See Taylor, supra note 50, at 228; Hudec, supra note
17 at 13. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, Defensive
Unfairness: The Normative Structure of Section 301 in 2 FAIR
TRADE, supra note 3, at 420-22.
104

105

Hudec, supra note 17, at 13.

106

Professor Robert Hudec points out that GATT did not
approve of the unilateral United States trade restrictions
that
led to the WTO's establishment. Hudec, supra note 53, at 114115. This does not answer the point that these unilateral
restrictions may nevertheless be an appropriate model for
other bodies of law, because they demonstrate that trade
restrictions may help marshal support for strengthening an
international regime. Professor Hudec’s argument suggests
that unilateralism’s importance in the development of the WTO
29

The principle procedural difference between the WTO and the prior GATT organization
involves the nature of dispute settlement. The Dispute Settlement Understanding adopted as part of the
Uruguay round of GATT negotiations requires GATT's contracting parties to adopt a WTO panel
decision (or an appellate decision following a panel decision), unless the parties reach consensus against
adoption. 107 This means that WTO decisions will generally bind WTO members.
The agreement creating the WTO explicitly authorizes the use of trade sanctions, called
"suspension of concessions," to enforce decisions of panels established under the WTO to resolve
disputes regarding alleged breaches of GATT obligations.108 Hence, the WTO itself adopts the
principle of using coercion to achieve trade goals.109

does not demonstrate formal inconsistency in WTO policy toward
unilateral measures. I do not mean to suggest that the WTO's
opposition to unilateral environmental trade measures
indicates formal inconsistency.
107

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade
Negotiations, Annex 2, app. 1, arts. 16(4), 17(14), in URUGUAY
RESULTS, supra note 13, at 417, 419 (1994)[hereinafter, DSU
Understanding].
108

Id. art. 22.

Taylor, supra note 50, at 259 (discussing "WTO goal of
coercing the offending country into compliance with its GATT
obligations."). Professor Hudec, a leading GATT expert has
opined that the “strength of the GATT legal system” does not
rest “on the GATT’s power to authorize trade sanctions."
Hudec, supra
note 53, at 114. Rather, “the force of GATT law has rested,
first, in its ability to make objective legal rulings, and
second, in the tendency of such rulings to elicit community
pressure for compliance.” Id. The agreement creating the WTO,
however, reflects a judgment that such pressures are not
109
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As global integration proceeds, national governments experience a loss in their power to assure
adequate environmental quality for their own people, unless they can influence conduct abroad that
harms their environment or that of the global commons (e.g. oceans) upon which they depend.110 This
has led to the growth of international environmental law. Governments have threatened import
restrictions (and occasionally export restrictions) to encourage the development of agreed upon
international environmental standards and compliance with the terms of adopted standards.111 None of
these uses of trade sanctions necessarily involves a protectionist economic strategy. Rather, they
involve using trade restrictions as a strategy to meet non-economic goals.112

always adequate, since the Dispute Settlement Understanding
authorizes trade restrictions to enforce WTO panel decisions.
Some international environmental treaties reflect similar
judgments. For example, the Montreal Protocol on Ozone
Depleting Substances authorizes trade restrictions, but relies
primarily upon information and diplomacy to encourage
participation. See
RICHARD BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY (1992)(describing how diplomacy
and information helped treaty development); Elizabeth P.
Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime
Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 534-37
(1991) (discussing incentive structure and its effects). The
potential threat of sanctions, while not necessarily the sole
mechanism for securing compliance, may play a subtle and
important role in encouraging compliance with both GATT and
the Montreal Protocol.
See Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in The Age of
Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 168, 201 (1999).
110

See David M. Driesen, The Congressional Role in
International Environmental Law and its Implications for
Statutory Interpretation, 19 B.C. ENVT’L AFF. L. REV. 287, 303308 (1991).
111

See Hudec, supra note 53, at 136, 149 (environmental
trade measures usually are directed at genuine environmental
112
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Steve Charnovitz has pointed out that unilateral trade restrictions aimed at encouraging
multilateral action have preceded the adoption of most significant health and environmental treaties (just
as they proceeded the formation of the WTO).113 Multilateral agreements to impose trade sanctions
have also encouraging parties to join international environmental treaties. Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances, for example, included a provision that barred imports of
ozone depleting chemicals from countries that did not agree to limit their production of ozone depleters
under the Protocol. 114 This provision, in combination with other provisions providing more positive
incentives for compliance, tended to discourage transfer of ozone depleting chemical production from
parties to the Protocol countries to rapidly growing non-parties.115 Such a transfer might have
otherwise defeated efforts to control ozone depleting chemicals, destroyed the stratospheric ozone
concerns).
See Charnovitz, Defogging, supra note 6, at 493. See
e.g. Driesen, supra note 111, at 303-305 (discussing example
of trade restrictions helping create strengthened
international standards for oil pollution from ships).
113

See BENEDICK, supra note 109, at 91-92 (diplomatic
history and nature of provisions); Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Concluded at
Montreal, September 16, 1987, entered into force January 1,
1989, 26 I.L.M. 1550, art. 4 (1987).
114

See Barratt-Brown, supra note 109, at 534-37
(discussing incentive structure and its effects). CFC
production in the developing countries has not grown at rates
high enough to offset the cuts in developed countries. See
Montreal Treaty Seen as Major Success in Effort to Protect
Stratospheric Ozone Layer, 28 ENVT'L REP. 778 (BNA) (August 29,
1997). Yet, some contraband exports continue to bedevil
implementation of the protocol. See Environmental
Investigating Group Finds Widespread Trade of CFCs in Europe,
20 INT'L ENVT. REP. (BNA) 869 (September 17, 1997).
115

32

layer, and created a public health and environmental catastrophe.116
International environmental law has grown in the last few decades.117 It suffers, however, from
"treaty proliferation."118 Governments have often agreed to treaties with rather broadly expressed
obligations, but often have not taken the actions necessary to meet treaty objectives.119
Governments have often used trade sanctions to encourage compliance with existing treaties.
The United States, for example, has used unilateral threats of import restrictions to encourage
governments to comply with international fisheries agreements.120 Many nations, including several
See Barratt-Brown, supra note 109, at 534 (discussing
need to discourage "the huge potential increase" in developing
country production and consumption of ozone depleting
chemicals): Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade
With Preservation of the Global Commons: Can We Prosper and
Protect, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1429 (1992) (a one percent
decline in ozone level may cause 200,000 or more skin cancer
cases and cause serious damage to peoples' eyes). Although
the ozone layer has suffered substantial depletion, it may
recover by the middle of the next century. See Montreal
Treaty, supra note 115.
116

117

Driesen, supra note 111, at 287.

See Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance with
International Environmental Agreements: The Baker's Dozen
Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (1999)(more than 1000
international legal instruments have provisions addressing
environmental protection).
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See generally David Wirth, The International Trade
Regime and the Municipal Law of Federal States: How Close a
Fit?, 49 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (1992)(international
environmental system invites "holdouts, free riders, laggards,
scofflaws, and defectors.")
119

See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions
and the GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign
Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 751 (1994).
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underdeveloped countries, responded to the pressure by improving conservation practices.121 The
European Union has also used import bans to meet environmental and public health goals.122
Multilateral agreements sometimes provide for import restrictions as an enforcement strategy.123
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES) generally
forbids international trade in listed endangered species and their parts without a permit.124 The treaty
Daniel Esty refers to unilateral imposition of sanctions to
advance compliance with internationally agreed upon standards
as
"multilateral unilateralism." See ESTY, supra note 1, at 140.
He distinguishes this from trade restrictions that countries
have agreed to in multilateral treaties, unilaterally imposed
trade sanctions to address a transboundary or global harm
"without the benefit of any multilateral agreement," and
sanctions imposed without multilateral agreement to address
harms having no direct impact on the imposing country. Id. at
139. My discussion relies implicitly on Professor Esty's very
useful framework. See also Steve Charnovitz, A Taxonomy of
Environmental Trade Measures, 6 GEO. INT'L L. REV. 1 (1993)
(presenting a more detailed taxonomy).
Driesen, supra note 111, at 305; Charnovitz, Pelly
Amendments, supra note 120.
121

See Hudec, supra note 14, at 104-105 (describing
various European trade restrictions).
122

See e.g. Wold, supra note 23, at 880-886 (analyzing
GATT legality of the Basel Convention, which limits shipment
of hazardous waste).
123
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Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES), opened for signature March 3, 1973,
(1976), 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243
art. II, par. 4. See e.g. Defenders of Wildlife v. Endangered
Species Scientific Authority, 659 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied sub nom., International Assoc. of Fish & Wildlife
Agencies v. Defenders of Wildlife, 454 U.S. 963
(1981)(adjudicating validity of bobcat export decisions under
Endangered Species Act provisions
34

has enjoyed some success because it aims squarely at limiting trade as a strategy. 125 Agreements
seeking to protect biodiversity that do not rely on trade sanctions have often achieved little.126
Prior to the 1990s, GATT seemed to treat international efforts to limit pollution and destruction
of natural resources through trade restrictions as GATT compliant. During the development of the
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,127 a "legal expert from the . . . GATT
secretariat stated that GATT did not forbid the use of trade sanctions to encourage non-signatories of
these important environmental treaties to comply with the agreements."128
Countries have sometimes unilaterally imposed trade restrictions to enforce environmental
standards. The United States, for example, successfully used unilateral trade restrictions to encourage a
number of nations to abandon tuna fishing techniques that killed dolphins.129 In the 1990s, however,

implementing CITES).
125

See Wold, supra note 23, at 870-74.

See Chris Wold, The Futility, Utility, and Future of
the Biodiversity Convention, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1,
1 (1998)(biodiversity convention has accomplished little of
substance). Of course, the lack or presence of trade
sanctions does not, by itself, explain whether a treaty will
be successful.
See id. at 4-22 (explaining reasons for biodiversity
convention’s failure). Nevertheless, the conspicuous
coincidence of trade sanctions and success should caution one
against too quickly concluding that trade sanctions are
useless.
126

127

Sept. 16, 1987, art. 4(8), 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987).

128

BENEDICK, supra note 109, at 91.

129

U.S. Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, September 3,
1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 ¶ 2.7
(1993)[hereinafter
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first Mexico and then the Netherlands and the European Economic Community mounted challenges to a
United States ban on tuna imports caught with purse seine nets in a manner that would kill many
dolphins.130 GATT panels held the ban contrary to GATT.131 At the time, GATT required adoption of
a panel decision by consensus of member countries in order for the decision to bind member
governments, and this never occurred.132 Under GATT law, even adopted panel decisions lack formal
precedential value.133 In spite of the lack of formal precedential value, these decisions have greatly
Tuna/Dolphin I](Panama and Ecuador prohibited setting purse
seine nets on dolphins after U.S. imposition of trade
restrictions); Laurel H. Hyde, Comment, Dolphin Conservation
in the Tuna Industry: The United States Role in an
International Problem, 16 San Diego L. Rev. 665, 691-92
(1979)(unilateral measures brought compliance by Senegal,
Congo, Spain, and New Zealand with U.S. conservation
practices).
130

Tuna/Dolphin I, ¶¶ 2.1-2.7; General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 ¶¶ 2.2,
2.5-2.15 (1994)[hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II]. For background
on the relevant provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
see Deidre McGrath, Writing Different Lyrics to the Same Old
Tune: The New (and Improved) 1997 Amendments to the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 431, 431-39
(1998); Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964
(N.D. Cal. 1990) (ordering application of import ban to
countries fishing with purse seine nets).
131

Tuna/Dolphin I, ¶ 7.1; Tuna/Dolphin II, ¶¶ 6.1-6.2.
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Charnovitz, supra note 101, at 719.

See Canada-Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and
Yoghurt, Dec. 5, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 68, 85
(1990) (prior panel reports are relevant but not dispositive);
European Economic Community-Restrictions on Imports of Dessert
Apples Complaint by Chile, June 22, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th
Supp.) at 93, 124 (1990) (panel not bound by prior panel's
reasoning); Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L
133
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influenced the WTO.134
The two Tuna/Dolphin decisions' central rationales have little to do with a concept of free trade
as trade free from discrimination against imports. The decisions seem instead to advance a principle
limiting international coercion aimed at advancing competing policy goals.135 The Tuna/Dolphin
decisions both criticize the use of national coercion through trade restrictions to force foreign countries
to protect dolphins.136 Similarly, the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate decision held that the United States may
not seek to force other countries to adopt regulatory regimes identical to those of the United States
through trade restrictions.137 The Shrimp/Turtle appellate panel considered the "coercive effect" of the

L. 379, 430-33 (1996); Jackson, Congruence or Conflict?, supra
note 52, at 1272-73. Cf. Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare
Decisis and International Trade Law, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845
(1999)(arguing that a "de facto" doctrine of stare Decisis now
governs WTO appellate decisions).
See e.g. WTO Report of the Panel on U.S. Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, October 12,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 832, ¶¶ 7.11-7.17 (1998)(accepting logic of
Tuna/Dolphin case in finding that prohibition on importing
shrimp caught in ways endangering sea turtles violates GATT
article XI), affirmed on other grounds, WTO Report of the
Appellate Body on U.S. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, October 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 832 (1998).
134

See Hudec, supra note 14, at 118-119 (explaining that
the Tuna/Dolphin decisions held U.S. restrictions to be of a
"coercive design").
135

136

Tuna/Dolphin II ¶¶ 5.25-5.27, 5.38, 5.39
(characterizing the tuna embargoes as efforts "to force other
countries to change their policies with respect to persons and
things within their own jurisdiction."); Tuna/Dolphin I ¶ 5.27
(characterizing tuna embargoes as unilaterally determining the
policies must follow in order to have rights under GATT).
137

Shrimp/Turtle Appellate, at 64-65.
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United States’ turtle protection program its "most conspicuous flaw."138 These decisions implicitly
define free trade as including a principle of non-coercion, at least through trade measures.
The theoretical support for a non-coercion principle in international law comes not from
economic theory, but from theories of international relations.139 Scholars have debated extensively the
appropriateness of coercion in various contexts and situations.140 Widespread agreement exists that
nations should not resort to coercion without first attempting to resolve differences through negotiation.
However, most scholars recognize that when negotiation cannot resolve important disputes, then some
degree of coercion may be appropriate. Scholars disagree, of course, about when to employ coercion

138

Id. ¶ 161.

See Shrimp/Turtle Appellate ¶ 164 (declaring use of an
economic embargo to force a foreign nation to adopt an
American regulatory program unacceptable in "international
trade relations."); Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Unilateral
State Action in Preventing International Environmental Injury,
14 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 51 (1981).
139

See e.g. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across
Borders: Nonintervention and NonForcible Influence over
Domestic Affairs, 83 AJIL 1 (1989)(discussing financial
assistance to political campaigns and use of economic
leverage); Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules
on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (1986); Oscar
Schacter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1620 (1984); M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977); PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION (M. Shovic
ed. 1972); Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination:
Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AJIL 642 (1984); G.
Hufbauer & J Schott, Economic Sanctions in Support of Foreign
Policy Goals (1983); Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (1985);
D. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (1985); Bowett, Economic
Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1972);
ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (R. Lillich
ed. 1976).
140
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and how much coercion is appropriate in various situations. The practice of international relations
seems consistent with the theory. Nations typically try to solve disputes through negotiation and resort
to coercion only as a last resort. Countries vary in their willingness to employ coercion to resolve
different issues when negotiations break down.
Countries can coerce each other without discrimination. For example, a country may demand
compliance with an environmental standard as a condition of importation and impose an identical
standard on its own domestic producers. Such a standard may coerce, but it does not necessarily
discriminate.
Defining free trade as trade free of the effects of international coercion would create a different
agenda for expansion of free trade. Expansion of free trade would involve decreasing reliance upon
coercive measures to advance policy goals.
E. Trade Restrictions and Barriers
Free traders often state that they do not oppose environmental protection; they only oppose
trade barriers and restrictions as the means of protecting the environment.141 This would suggest that

See e.g. David Palmeter, International Trade Law in
the Twenty-First Century, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1653, 1655
(1995) (governments are free to act with minimal interference:
so long as they do not discriminate, so long as they do not
erect new trade barriers, governments can do whatever they
wish). See also Farber & Hudec, supra note 10, at 64
(distinguishing between policing disguised “trade
restrictions” and adequate environmental protection); Jagdish
Bhagwati, Introduction in I FAIR TRADE, supra note 3, at 1
(referring to the "simple elimination of trade barriers").
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one can protect the environment adequately without trade barriers and restrictions.142 The three models
provide useful analytical tools to help understand why the concepts of trade barriers and trade
restrictions do not offer an acceptable substitute for an adequate definition of free trade.
A laissez-faire definition of "free trade" as involving absolute license - trade without any burdens
- might well require the elimination of almost all even-handed national regulation and taxation of
business, all international coercion, and all regulation and taxation discriminating against foreign
commerce. Only regulation that discriminates against domestic production for the domestic market can
avoid creation of burdens upon international trade.143 Any international coercion, any discrimination
against imports, and most even-handed government tax or regulation burdens international trade.
The statement that even-handed taxation and regulation creates burdens for international trade
requires some explanation. Even-handed taxation and regulation implies taxes and regulations that
apply equally to all relevant businesses, including importers and exporters. Any tax or regulation that
applies to all relevant products sold in the taxing or regulating jurisdiction may increase the cost of
imports entering the taxing or regulating jurisdiction. Any tax or regulation of production processes that
applies to all relevant production within the taxing or regulating jurisdiction may increase the cost of
goods that the taxing or regulating jurisdiction exports. For these reasons, even-handed taxation and
regulation burdens international trade.
Governments may tax or regulate only domestic producers that produce only for the domestic
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See Palmeter, supra note 141, at 1655.

See Anderson, supra note 26, at 767-78 (Tuna/Dolphin
Panel effectively barred even-handed treatment in favor of
discrimination against domestic producers).
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market without burdening international trade. But a country that taxes or regulates even-handedly, i.e.
that does not systematically discriminate against companies with no involvement with international tradewill often create burdens upon international trade.
This means that as international integration proceeds, even-handed regulation and taxation
creates more and more burdens upon international trade.144 A jurisdiction with no international trade
could even-handedly tax and regulate everything sold in the jurisdiction with no impact upon
international trade. At the other extreme, if all sectors have some involvement with international trade,
then all even-handed commercial regulation and taxation burdens international trade. More integration
implies greater burdens upon international trade from routine domestic regulation and taxes.
As global integration proceeds, demands not to use trade restrictions or barriers become
indistinguishable from a demand for laissez-faire government. The terms "trade restriction" and "trade
barrier" plausibly apply to almost every tax and regulation directly affecting business.
The vague idea that international trade law should eliminate "trade restrictions" or "trade
barriers" implies rejection of all taxes and regulation and the acceptance of all three models of what free
trade is. It embraces laissez-fair, anti-coercion, and anti-discrimination as free trade goals. Of course,
a full embrace of laissez-faire makes other goals unnecessary.
Most regulations that apply equally to imported and domestically produced goods and services
include a prohibition on sales and/or shipment made without obeying the regulation. To make this ban
on sales of non-compliant goods effective, almost every statute providing for domestic regulation of
See generally, Charnovitz, supra note 6, at 478 (as
the interdependence of economies increase, more environmental
measures come within GATT's purview).
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products either explicitly or implicitly forbids importation of goods that do not comply with national
laws.145
An enormously wide range of federal laws rely upon these import restrictions, including
criminal, intellectual property, telecommunications, transportation, national security, health and safety,
and conservation laws.146 Since almost all federal regulation rests upon federal constitutional authority
to regulate commerce,147 these prohibitions usually couple a ban on interstate sales or shipment of noncompliant goods with an explicit ban on importation of non-complying goods.148 Some statutes use less
explicit formulations (such as a ban on introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce) that still use import restrictions as part of a ban on sales or shipment of non-complying
goods.149

See Appendix for citations, which are too numerous to
cite in a footnote.
145

146

See id., infra.

See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Lobsters from Canada, 3 Can. Trade &
Commodity Tax Cas. (CCH) 8182 ¶ 7.5.1 (1990)(explaining that
Magnuson Act prohibits any person from selling lobster in
interstate or foreign commerce in order to assert federal
commerce clause jurisdiction).
147

See e.g. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (prohibiting sale or
importation migratory birds); 16 U.S.C. § 971e (prohibiting
the sale or importation of certain fish); 18 U.S.C. §§ 553,
2313 (prohibiting importation or interstate sale of stolen
vehicles).
148

See e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 350a(c)(prohibiting introduction
or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of
nonregistered new infant formula); 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(prohibits intentional distribution of illegal drugs).
149
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Almost all regulations applicable to goods rely upon the threat of a sales ban to secure
compliance. If this threat is removed, then regulation becomes virtually impossible to enforce. If a
person can sell goods without complying with applicable regulations, then she probably will do so.
Hence, regulations must forbid the import or export of non-complying goods in order to be effective.
Once one realizes that virtually all "domestic" regulations rely upon coercion the distinction
between a laissez-faire model and an anti-coercion model begins to collapse. Any domestic regulation,
insofar as it applies to imported goods, aims to coerce a foreign country (or its nationals) to make
goods acceptable to the regulating jurisdiction, upon pain of a ban. 150 Regulations that commentators
tend to regard as domestic and usually legitimate and those that some regard as extra-territorial and
therefore potentially illegitimate under an anti-coercion model function identically from the standpoint of
direct burdens upon international trade and both involve coercion.
The WTO may have realized that all regulation involves coercion in the Shrimp/Turtle case.
The WTO Appellate Body reversed a Panel ruling broadly prohibiting countries from requiring
exporting countries to meet the importing countries' policies in order to obtain market access.151 In
doing so, the Appellate Body recognized that "conditioning access to" an importer's "domestic market
on" the exporting country’s compliance with an importing country's "unilaterally prescribed" policy
"may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures falling within the scope" of the Article XX

See Charnovitz, supra note 113, at 10581 ("virtually
every product standard has an element of force to it").
150

151

Report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, October 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118,
¶¶ 112, 121 (1999).
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exceptions to GATT. 152 The article XX exceptions to GATT cover most subjects of national
regulation, so this statement suggests broad recognition that regulation generally involves coercion.
Hence, a free trade principle based on opposition to international coercion and a free trade
principle based on allegiance to laissez-faire principles might have very similar results. All regulation
and taxation burdens international trade and usually imposes quantitative restrictions on non-compliant
shipments.
Non-discriminatory even-handed regulation, however, burdens economic activity in general. It
does not increase burdens upon international trade beyond those the regulation imposes upon like
domestic economic activity.
Insofar as either national or international regulatory efforts rely upon import restrictions as an
enforcement mechanism, the exporting country or company may export anyway. But in order to do
that, the exporting company or country must meet the importing country’s regulatory standards, hence
the burden. Similarly, a domestic firm making a product for the domestic market must comply with the
same regulatory standard in order to sell within its own market. Both domestic and foreign firms have
the same burden.
Discrimination against imports, however, constitutes a burden on international trade that does
not apply to commercial activity in general. The very logic of discrimination disadvantages foreign
products.
In sum, almost every tax and regulation of business constitutes a trade barrier or restriction in a
global economy. A laissez-faire or anti-coercion definition of free trade might imply elimination of most
152

Id. ¶ 121.
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taxes and regulations applicable to business, since all regulations and taxes coerce and most burden
trade economically. Only an anti-discrimination concept functions more narrowly and systematically
ferrets out especially problematic treatment of international trade, as opposed to general taxation and
regulation of commerce.
II. The Models and WTO Legitimacy
This part will show how these models help illuminate the issue of WTO legitimacy. I assume
that a legal institution acting within the scope of its competence commands some degree of respect for
controversial decisions, because society accepts its right to make certain decisions.153 This implies that
a body making decisions that lie beyond its institutional competence will often not command such
respect, and will only enjoy the support of those who happen to like its decisions.
This part will discuss the policy issues that arise under each model and ask whether the WTO,
an international institution devoted to free trade, provides an appropriate forum for making the policy
choices involved in implementing the competing models.154 This part will then show how the models
See generally FRANCK, supra note 14, at 111-12
(discussing the “compliance pull” of decisions by legitimate
institutions).
153

154

The legal process school focuses upon the limitations
and capabilities of legal institutions. See generally HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994). Legal scholarship has placed
more emphasis on institutional analysis in recent years. See
e.g. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1393 (1996); Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten LinkagesHistorical Institutionalism and Analysis of the World Trade
Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 461, 461 (1998)
(describing institutionalism as "firmly entrenched in legal
scholarship" and a "powerful and alluring" theory for
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help explain the case law, some of the scholarly commentary, and misunderstandings between free
traders and environmentalists. This part concludes that a model based on an non-discrimination
principle, rather than either a laissez-faire or non-coercion principle, provides the most legitimacy for
the WTO.
A. The WTO: A Specialized International Institution Devoted to Free Trade
In order for WTO decisions to appear legitimate, it must render rulings appropriate to its
institutional character. The WTO is a specialized institution devoted to furthering free trade.155 Its
governing bodies, including dispute resolution panels, consist of trade experts, people who have
devoted their lives to advancing free trade.156 Dispute settlement panelists usually lack expertise in

"international law scholarship."); Harold Hongju Koh, Why do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2619
(1997) (describing the relationship between Hart and Sacks
work and that of Abram Chayes in international law). Other
scholars have used institutional analysis to describe what
issues the WTO should address. See e.g. Philip M. Nichols,
Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the
Limits of the World Trade Organization's Authority, 28 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 711 (1996).
See Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Should UNCLOS or GATT/WTO
Decide Trade and Environment Disputes, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
287, 311 (1998) (arguing that GATT excludes consideration of
non-GATT law and that environmental protection is not a GATT
objective). Professor Andrew Strauss argues that the WTO can
change to become less of a trade organization. Strauss, supra
note 51, at 803-804. My institutional analysis will, however,
focus on the WTO as it currently exists.
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See Charnovitz, supra note 113, at 10582 (GATT
panelists are generally trade attorneys, professors, or
current government officials with a "GATT-centric"
perspective); DSU Understanding, supra note 107 art. 8(1).
Some of these trade experts are diplomats with little legal
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public health and environmental issues.157 Currently, the trade ministries of national governments
generally control the WTO.158
The WTO does not purport to determine countries' obligations toward each other under
international law generally.159 Rather, it focuses upon the determination of a country's obligation under
GATT and related agreements.160
expertise. See Hudec, supra note 17, at 34-35. They often
rely upon the WTO Secretariat's legal staff for expertise.
Id. Environmental groups have also claimed that business
groups have representatives on WTO advisory groups that do not
include environmentalists. Strauss, supra note 51, at 801 n.
86.
See Dunoff, International Trade, supra note 24, at
352-54 (trade bodies lack the experience or expertise to deal
with contentious "linkage" issues); Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & Trade-Environment
Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043 (1994); Dunoff, Trading
Institutions, supra note 15.
157

See Hudec, supra note 53, at 110-111 (GATT policies
tend to reflect the views of government trade ministries).
158

See Guruswamy, supra note 155, at 319-321 (criticizing
the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding for assuming that
trade agreements constitute a sufficient body of law for all
disputes).
159

See DSU Understanding, supra note 107 art. 3(2)
(charging dispute settlement panels with the task of
preserving the rights and obligations of WTO members under
free trade agreements). The second Tuna/Dolphin decision
illustrates this. In that case, the United States urged the
panel to consider various international agreements authorizing
trade restriction to protect the environment in judging the
legality of its restrictions on tuna. See GATT Dispute
Settlement Panel Report on U.S. Import Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 ¶¶ 2.3, 2.4, 3.17; 3.21-23; 3.31
(1994). The panel followed the Vienna Convention's rules on
interpreting treaties, with one very noteworthy exception.
160
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The WTO has recently taken some steps designed to enhance the legitimacy of its trade and
environment decisions. The WTO’s rules now authorize, but do not require, dispute settlement panels
to consider amicus briefs from NGOs.161 The amicus procedure, if dispute settlement panels seriously
consider amicus briefs, may improve the WTO’s legitimacy.
Recently, partly in response to public concerns about the WTO’s growing influence on health
and the environment, WTO panels have begun consulting scientific experts.162 This may increase their
capacity to understand scientific issues. But the WTO’s credibility on health and environmental issues
will remain suspect as long as the decision-makers are trade specialists and the organization as a whole,
remains, as it is now, a creature of national trade ministries.163

Id. ¶¶ 5.18-5.20. It failed to consider whether the
combination of international environmental treaty obligations
and GATT obligations taken together might lead to a different
result, an inquiry that the Vienna Convention's article
31(3)(c) calls for.
Compare id. § 5.19 (finding
environmental treaties irrelevant in interpreting GATT) with
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(c), May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 691 (1969). The GATT
panel considered itself competent only to adjudicate GATT
obligations in isolation from obligations under other
treaties.
See Report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, October 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118,
¶¶ 98-110 (1999).
161

See id. ¶¶ 9-10; Report of the Panel: EC Measures
Concerning Meat And Meat Products (Hormones), 1997 WL 569984,
*125-181 (August 18, 1997).
162

See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and", supra note 15
(GATT/WTO's expansion into new substantive areas raises
serious questions about institutional competence and
expertise).
163
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The WTO's competence derives from its expertise in international trade. The notion that expert
judgment in international trade should merit respect comes from the idea that a coherent economic
theory amenable to administration by specialists governs the area. That is why the definition of free
trade is so critical.
The WTO is also an international institution. Its legitimacy depends in part upon its performing
a function suitable to an international institution.
The WTO lacks democratic legitimacy.164 Citizens do not elect its officials. And legislative
bodies do not select trade panel members or other officials. For this reason, a WTO dispute resolution
panel is much less democratic than say, the United States Supreme Court, which itself is generally
regarded as an anti-majoritarian institution.165 After all, an elected official, the President of the United
States nominates the Court's justices, and an elected Senate must approve their nomination. 166 No
such democratic procedure governs the selection of trade panelists.167
B. Policy Questions and Legitimacy Under the Three Models
An understanding of the policy questions each model raises will set the stage for understanding
how selection of one or another model of free trade might influence WTO legitimacy. This section will
See Esty, supra note 30, at 715. See also Wirth,
supra note 20, at 353-55, 365-372 (discussing barriers to
effective
public participation in affecting the adoption and
interpretation of trade agreements).
164

See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1986)
165

166

See U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2.

167

See DSU Understanding, supra note 107 art. 8.
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have something to say about the desirability of pursuing the policy goals of laissez-faire government,
non-discriminatory government, and non-coercive government. But the primary purpose of the policy
discussion is to aid understanding of WTO legitimacy under the competing models.
An institution's decisions tend to appear legitimate when they fit the institution's character.
Different models of free trade imply different kinds of policy judgments. Some of these policy
judgments seem more fitting for the WTO than others.
1. Laissez-Faire
Those who support free trade at all support it because it may enhance human welfare by
increasing prosperity.168 Free trade's claim to advance welfare comes from economic theory's
prediction that free trade will increase the amount of goods and services available and lower prices.169
But even neoclassical economists do not argue that more goods and services at lower prices alone
necessarily improves human welfare.170

See Hudec, supra note 53, at 108 (GATT improves
national economies' effectiveness and combats poverty).
168

See Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and
Environment: Lessons From the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1329, 1330 (1992)(empirical studies show a strong
correlation between trade liberalization and economic growth
rates). Cf. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 372(Phillip Anthony
O'Hara ed.)(1999) (most economists would support free trade as
"maximizing economic welfare," but the "facts suggest no
negative correlation between protection and growth.").
169

See e.g. Alistair Ulph, Environmental Policy and
International Trade, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 148-149 (Carlo Carraro & Domenico Siniscalco eds.
1997)(most economists believe that laissez-faire is obviously
not desirable when externalities are present); JAGDISH BHAGWATI,
PROTECTIONISM 126-27 (1988) (supporting state intervention to
170
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They recognize that activities that seem wealth enhancing may generate “external costs,” costs
that the general public experiences but the producer does not pay for.171 Air pollution, for example,
generates such external costs by damaging public health and the environment. Since a producer in a
completely laissez-faire economy does not pay the cost of reducing pollution, the prices of his products
do not reflect these costs. Because of this, even in an otherwise perfect market, the purchase of
products made through processes that pollute may reduce society's welfare.172 The theory of free trade
does not endorse the notion that trade without environmental protections will prove optimal.173
While economic theory does not support a laissez-faire goal, it may support movement away
from "too much" regulation or "too little" regulation.174 According to neoclassical economics, such
policy decisions would involve weighing the benefits of regulations against their costs.175 In the
environmental area, such an exercise might involve complex scientific judgments and comparing

correct for market failure).
See e.g. Jackson, Congruence or Conflict, supra note
52, at 1231.
171

See Roberts, supra note 71, at 378 (sanitary and
phytosanitary measures may increase welfare because they
correct "market failures"); Frederic L. Kirgis, Effective
Pollution control in Industrialized Countries: International
Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the GATT, 70
MICH. L. REV. 860, 862-63 (1972) (explaining how lack of
regulation can produced an "external diseconomy”).
172

See Jackson, supra note 52, at 1231 (describing
environmental protection as an "exception" to the "general
policy of liberalizing trade.").
173

174

See Driesen, supra note 47, at 583-585.

175

See Chang, supra note 23, at 2189.
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incommensurable impacts.176
A trade organization seems poorly suited to deciding on the degree of laissez-faire government
we should have. Decisions to tax and regulate generally involve pursuit of non-commercial (or less
directly commercial) objectives, such as protecting public health, protecting the environment, improving
education, or providing social services. The notion that trade experts possess some special expertise in
deciding whether a given tax or regulation will advance human welfare seems very problematic.177
Trade panel decisions that seem to involve judgments about the need for a given or regulation
will rarely seem legitimate. Few people will have confidence in trade experts' judgments about the need
for regulation, because trade experts have little competence in assessing the validity of the reasons for a
regulation.178 Trade experts are not experts on public health and the environment, and their judgments

See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988) (arguing
against monetary valuation of environmental harms); CHRISTOPHER
STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN (1993); Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability & Valuation in the Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
834-40 (1994); McGarity, supra note 85 (discussing scientific
complexity of regulating carcinogens); Wendy E. Wagner, The
Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613
(1995) (arguing that treatment of science as determinative of
outcomes amounts to a charade given incomplete nature of
available data). See generally Symposium, Law and
Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998).
176

See Farber & Hudec, supra note 24, at 1432 ("GATT
tribunals have few credentials to assess the success or social
value of regulatory measures and lack any recognized political
mandate to do so."). Cf. Stewart, supra note 169, at 1360
(claiming that evaluating the seriousness of a pollution
spillover is not beyond the competence of “a specialized
tribunal”).
177

178

This is precisely what the Beef Hormone panel did.
See Walker, supra note 75, at 319 (describing cases under the
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about the scientific justification for health or environmental measures (for example) will tend to
command little respect outside of the community of trade experts and economists who share similar
assumptions.179
The WTO’s international character also will not enhance the legitimacy of its decisions in this
area. Most trade experts recognize the legitimacy of national differences in how highly to value
protection of public health and the environment. These differences surely involve different national
views about the degree of caution to be exercised in protecting the public from potential public health
and environmental threats. International decisions second guessing these national views will seem

SPS agreement as addressing the clash between efficient
international trade and the "sovereign duty to protect
health").
179

Professor Hudec, however, argues that no institution
can make a completely objective assessment of environmental
harms. See Hudec, supra note 53, at 113 ("No government or
international institution" can "claim complete objectivity" in
assessing
environmental harm). But many institutions are superior to
the WTO in evaluating environmental harms. And a neutral
institution, such as the International Court of Justice, might
better make judgments requiring a weighing of commercial and
non-commercial values. See generally Patti Goldman, Resolving
the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of a Neutral
Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1279
(1992); Cf. Richard J. McLaughlin, UNCLOS and the Demise of
the United States’ Use of Trade Sanctions to Protect Dolphins,
Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other International Marine Living
Resources, 21 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (1994) (claiming that the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, if ratified, might
limit unilateral measures protecting the marine environment).
Moreover, national governments have relatively high democratic
legitimacy in weighing competing values. Cf. Hudec, supra note
53, at 113 (authority of environmental decisions will depend
on the “political legitimacy of the institution making the
decision”).
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inappropriate. If a country values health and environmental protection enough to assume very little
health and environmental risk in order to enhance its economic welfare, it is not clear why a trade
organization should have authority to override the national decision.
Measures protecting the environment and public health may be unsound. But the connection
between generally unsound measures and international trade seems less direct than the connection
between anti-foreign discriminatory measures and international trade. To take an extreme case, let's
assume that a country panders to ludicrous public fears and passes a measure that restricts or burdens
commerce in some fashion, without even arguably advancing public health at all.180 This stupid measure
harms the country's welfare, but it would harm the country's welfare even if the country were an
autarky. Absent this measure, its own producers would be free of the burden the measure imposes and
consumers could enjoy a better product or lower prices.
In fact, a WTO challenge would only arise when foreign producers experience some of the
burden the measure imposes, so such a challenge will have some connection with international trade.
But the fundamental grounds for disagreeing with the measure under a principle moving toward laissezfaire have little to do with the international character of the measure. Indeed, the measure may be
conceived of as purely domestic, since it may operate only in the territory of the stupid country.
This contrasts with the strong connection between an anti-discrimination rationale and the
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I am assuming that the measure applies the same
requirements to domestic and foreign producers. Cf. Sykes,
supra note 11, at 10-12 (analyzing a stupid and discriminatory
requirement that foreign suppliers, but not domestic ones,
must hire an “agent to sit on a flagpole. . . and cluck like a
chicken).
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international character of the commercial interest served by holding illegal a discriminatory measure.
The essence of the problem involves a decision to treat foreign products differently from domestic ones.

2. International Coercion
Free trade might be thought of as a prohibition against using trade restraints as coercive
techniques. I have already pointed out that this may amount to the same thing as a laissez-faire
principle, since all taxes and regulations coerce. This section will focus on free trade defined somewhat
more narrowly as trade free of coercion in international relations between governments. This narrowed
definition of coercion excludes governmental coercion of foreign firms.
A policy decision about whether to employ trade restrictions to influence foreign environmental
practices involves a judgment about whether the chosen trade restrictions will prove effective.181 It also
might involve some judgment about the importance of the trade sanction’s environmental aim and the
amount and importance of its economic costs.182 Finally, such a policy decision, ideally, would take
into account the wider repercussions of imposing trade sanctions.
Trade specialists must be able to credibly make judgments about all of these factors in order for
their decisions about the appropriateness of trade restrictions, as coercion, to appear legitimate. This
implies a need to assess the legitimacy of WTO evaluation of effectiveness, utility, and wider
repercussions.
a. Effectiveness
181

See Anderson, supra note 26, at 777-78.

182

See Stewart, supra note 169, at 1360.
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Many trade specialists seem prone to imagine that trade sanctions almost always prove
ineffective.183 Some use economic theory to make predictions about trade restriction’s environmental
effectiveness.184
Some scholars have used economic theory to argue that trade restrictions are efficient in
theory.185 On the whole, economic theory seems an incomplete method for predicting how government
officials in foreign countries will react to trade restrictions aimed at promoting environmental goals.186
Making good judgments about whether trade sanctions induce environmentally favorable

See LAURA A. STROHM & PETER THOMPSON, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
THE E NVIRONMENT: A R EVIEW OF THE L ITERATURE 67-72, 90-95 (1996);
Jadgish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and Environment:
Does Environmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free
Trade, in 1 FAIR TRADE, supra note 1, at 196-97; Richard
Blackhurst & Arvind Subramanian, Promoting Multilateral
Cooperation on the Environment, in THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE
ISSUES 247-68 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds. 1992).
183

See e.g. Richard Eglin, Trade and Environment in THE
URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR DUNKEL (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Mathias Hirsch eds. 1998).
184

See e.g. Howard F. Chang, Carrots, Sticks, and
International Externalities, 17 INT'L REV. OF L. & Econ. 309
(1997) (arguing that trade restrictions are efficient, but
suggesting some need to limit them).
185

See generally Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown
Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra
note 187, at 2 (explaining that countries sometimes join
treaties to join an international bandwagon or because of
pressures from other governments or domestic constituencies);
David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a
Transnational Legal Context, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 101, ___ (2000)
(forthcoming) (arguing that assumption that national responses
to environmental problems do not always mirror the selfinterested rational choice assumptions that form the
foundation of economic theory).
186
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responses requires some expertise in the history of their use in international environmental affairs.
Scholars who have examined the empirical record state that trade sanctions have often proven
effective.187 Furthermore, predicting the effectiveness of any particular application of a sanction
involves consideration of a complicated set of factors, including not just economics but also cultural
considerations.188 Trade specialists do not seem especially well situated to evaluate the likely

See e.g. Hudec, supra note 53, at 144 ("trade
sanctions appear to have succeeded quite often"); Raj Bhala,
Hegelian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading
System, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 159, 166-172 (1997) (discussing
the factual record especially of trade sanctions under section
301); Charnovitz, supra note 89 (discussing history of Pelly
Amendment sanctions); Daniel P. Blank, Target-Based
Environmental Trade Measures: A Proposal for the New WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment, 15 STAN. ENVT'L L. J. 61,
62-63 (1996) (discussing effective use of sanctions against
Taiwan); Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean
Society, 478 U.S. 221, 225 (1985) (each threat of sanctions
under Pelly Amendments secured "commitments of future
compliance by
offending nations"); Alberta M. Sbragia and Philipp M.
Hildebrand, The European Union and Compliance: A Story in the
Making, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K.
Jacobson eds.) 238-240 (1998)[hereinafter ENGAGING
COUNTRIES](discussing the effectiveness of threatened CITES
trade sanctions in improving Italian compliance with CITES);
Driesen, supra note 111, at 303-305 (discussing how threatened
unilateral sanctions helped create international agreement to
strengthened standards preventing marine pollution from
ships). Cf. Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed
the Elephant, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1, 25-26 (1990)(ban on trade
in leopard parts have been far more successful then a ban on
trade in rhinoceros horns).
187

See Glennon, supra note 187, at 25-26 (explaining that
cultural factors probably explain why bans in trade in some
species parts succeed while others fail); Bilder, supra note
139, at 79-93; Victor et al., supra note 88, at 682-684;
188
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effectiveness of environmental trade measures.
b. Utility
The discussion of the laissez-faire model already explained why the WTO’s assessment of the
seriousness of various environmental problems will probably lack legitimacy. This defect will infect any
judgment about the overall utility of a coercive trade restriction.
At first glance, WTO judgment about the economic cost of a trade restriction, however, seems
to lie within the realm of its expertise. These costs will include potential reduction in the amount of
restricted goods sold and/or price increases. Yet, WTO decisions generally do not quantify these
costs. This raises the question of whether WTO decisions about the specific economic value of a
specific trade restrictions would appear legitimate.
Assessing these costs might actually prove quite difficult. Because trade restrictions in the
environmental area usually target a handful of products or practices, consideration of a trade
restriction’s impact should include consideration of the availability of substitutes for targeted products or
processes.189 For example, a prohibition on importation of wood harvested in an unsustainable manner
does not restrict imports of either sustainably harvested timber or other building materials.
Targeted trade restrictions may not directly limit the volume of international trade. They may

Anderson, supra note 26, at 777-78, 780-81 (discussing factors
affecting effectiveness).
Cf. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 880 F. Supp.
848 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (applying Pelly Amendment sanctions
to certain fish and wildlife products from Taiwan in order to
force Taiwan not to trade engage in trade in rhinoceros and
tiger parts and products banned under CITES).
189
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help steer its direction and content instead, toward more ecologically desirable products.190 This may
be a serious problem for firms that lose business, but a benefit to competitors.
These targeted restrictions may tend to raise the prices of goods. But that depends on the price
of substitutes. Sometimes, targeted restrictions may lead to lowered prices, by directing innovative
energy toward substitutes.191 For example, many companies substituted cheap soap and water for
expensive CFCs in response to world-wide efforts to limit CFCs. The restriction stimulated the
management work to figure out that these simpler and cheaper substitutes could, if used well, do the
job. Hence, labeling a ban of a substance as a trade “restriction” or “barrier” does not tell one whether
it will have any negative economic impact upon consumers. And the assessment of the economic
impact of targeted restrictions may require knowledge of alternative technologies and techniques that
may be difficult for an international trade institution to acquire. It might also require predictions about
economic dynamics that any institution would find very difficult.
Even if the WTO could assess the magnitude of the economic impacts of individual measures,
any weighing of this against the measure’s environmental value would appear illegitimate.192 Some
traded goods may spur serious environmental destruction while providing only minor benefits to their
purchasers’ lives. Too much trade in such goods may be economically destructive. The WTO seems

See generally Driesen, supra note 47, at 568-570
(describing substitution’s potential to deliver economic and
environmental benefits).
190

191

See e.g. id.

192

See Wirth, supra note 76, at 344-45.
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like a poor institution to appreciate the problems from insufficiently impeded trade.193 Nothing the
institution has done suggests any understanding of the role of international trade in helping foster
depletion of many of the world's most productive fisheries,194 the destruction of tropical rainforests,195

See Christine Crawford, Note, Conflicts Between the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and
the GATT in Light of Actions to Halt the Rhinoceros and Tiger
Trade, 7 GEO. INT'L. L. REV. 555, 556 (1995) (parties enter into
environmental agreements impinging upon trade precisely
because they want conservation to have priority over free
trade).
193

194

HILARY F. FRENCH, COSTLY TRADEOFFS: RECONCILING TRADE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 16-17 (1993)(38% of annual catch is exported);
Nicholas Lenssen, The Ocean Blues, WORLD WATCH, July/August
1989, at 26-35 (discussing quadrupling of fish exports and
destruction of coral
reefs through use of cyanide to collect fish for the aquarium
business).
See e.g. Malcom Gillis, Multinational Enterprises and
Environment and Resource Management Issues in the Indonesian
Tropical forest Sector, in MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, ENVIRONMENT AND
THE T HIRD WORLD 64-71(Charles S. Pearson, ed. 1987) (explaining,
inter alia, that foreign trade spurred much of the destruction
of Indonesian tropical rainforests); Marianne Schmink and
Charles H. Wood, The “Political Ecology” of Amazonia in LANDS
AT R ISK IN THE T HIRD W ORLD: L OCAL L EVEL P ERSPECTIVES 46(Peter D. Little
et al. eds. 1987)(claiming that producers of export crops are
responsible for most forest clearing in Amazonia); FRENCH,
supra note 194, at 10-13 (discussing trade’s contribution to
deforestation in Asia). Cf. Trade and Environment in GATT, 1
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1990/1991 (1992) (claiming that limiting
exports would not greatly decrease deforestation because of
large role of domestic consumption of wood). See also Anjali
Acharya, Plundering the Boreal Forests, WORLD WATCH, May/June
1995, at 21-29 (discussing the role of exports in cutting
Boreal forests).
195
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or the decline in biodiversity.196 Pursuit of the short-term goal of free trade, lower prices and higher
production now, may, with respect to some commodities (such as fish), prove economically (not to
mention ecologically) disastrous in the long run. One would not expect the WTO to have an unbiased
view of whether more robust use of trade restrictions might either directly address some of these
problems better or help develop adequate international regimes where they do not currently exist or
function poorly.
The most fundamental problem with the WTO's legitimacy in this area stems from the need to
evaluate the importance of competing environmental and commercial values in deciding upon the
desirability of trade restrictions. It lacks sufficient democratic credentials to make such judgments and
its pro-trade bias makes its judgments about this very suspect indeed.197
On the other hand, Professor Hudec suggests that politicians may systematically undervalue
trade restrictions’ true costs because of mercantilist misperceptions.198 While mercantilist conceptions

See FRENCH, supra note 194, at 27-28 (discussing the
impact of the international trade in wildlife). Of course,
habitat destruction, some fueled by domestic, rather than
international, economic activity also plays a huge role. See
also Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, “To Dream the Impossible
Dream”: Globalization and Harmonization of Environmental Laws,
20 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 205, 210 (1995) (referring to
deterioration of the ozone layer, global warming,
deforestation, water and air pollution, massive oil and
chemical spills, acid rain, waste disposal, and nuclear
hazards as “consequences of unrestrained free trade.”)
196

Accord Charnovitz, supra note 113, at 10585-86
(suggesting that U.S. regulation to protect dolphins may be
too stringent, but that GATT panels have no competence to
decide this).
197

198

Id. at 113.
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would lead to undervaluing the costs of discriminatory coercion, such perceptions would not lead to
undervaluing the cost of non-discriminatory coercion. As long as a coercive trade restriction applies the
same regulatory standards to both domestic and foreign producers, politicians have reason to take the
economic costs into account. Politicians may be accurately reflecting public preferences if they decide
that risking a small increase in prices may be worthwhile to protect against environmental harms that
many countries contribute to.
c. Wider Repercussions
A judgment about trade restrictions should involve some consideration of wider repercussions.
For example, widespread use of environmental trade measures may create a climate where companies
engaged in international commerce routinely consider environmental impacts of all of their decisions
and nations feel obliged to carry out their international environmental legal duties. On the other hand,
trade restrictions may provoke trade retaliation, thereby expanding their negative economic impact. In
the worst case, they may spark trade wars.

As an international organization, the WTO no doubt

has relevant expertise in international relations. The WTO regularly addresses the challenges of
unilateral and multilateral international policy-making.
Trade specialists do have expertise in understanding some of the potential for wider
repercussions from trade restrictions. GATT formed part of a response to economically and politically
disastrous trade wars and WTO's culture takes the potential for this kind of wider repercussion very
seriously.199

199

See Dunoff, Trading Institutions, supra note 15, at

610-12.
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This can be a strength. But it may cause a kind of paranoia, a tendency to see every trade
restriction as a movement toward repeating GATT's pre-natal disasters.
Trade experts tend to characterize the interest trade sanctions seek to advance in the narrowest
possible terms, while treating the interest impeded through trade sanctions in the broadest imaginable
terms. Hence, scholars writing about the Tuna/Dolphin decisions have described the interest trade
sanctions seek to advance as “dolphin protection”, rather than consistent enforcement of fisheries
regimes, or, even more broadly, the development of international standards protecting the
environment.200 On the other hand, they identify the interest harmed through the sanctions as
international free trade, or even, prosperity, rather than sales of dolphin-unsafe tuna or even sales of fish
products.201
This bias is completely understandable, since free trade experts may have experience trying to
expand trade in a variety of forums and may view the entire issue holistically. But others may
appropriately view competing interests holistically as well.
I have argued elsewhere that use of import restrictions to address international environmental
problems has greater legitimacy than import restrictions used in other areas, because environmental
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See Hudec, supra note 14, at 151.

201

Professor Hudec, for example, articulates GATT's
interests in general as involving advancing prosperity and
peace. Id. at 108-109. He does not discuss the broad aims of
environmental law. Instead, he lists several types of
specific environmental effects. Id. at 112. A parallel list
of potential effects of trade measures might include such
trivial outcomes as minor rises in prices, substitution of
goods, and declines in use of socially useless products, like
cigarettes. It would also include more major impacts.
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norms frequently address a legitimate world-wide problem.202 By way of contrast, a sanction levied for
commercial or military reasons seems more likely to appear focused on securing national advantage and
therefore seems less legitimate.203 I have argued, as have others, that the legitimacy of environmental
trade measures may vary with the geographic location of environmental harms and the activities causing
the harms.204 But generally, environmental norms enjoy a legitimacy that makes import restrictions less
likely to provoke retaliation in the international environmental area than in areas where the principle
advanced seems predicated solely on parochial national interests.205 This may explain why trade
restrictions to advance environmental goals have not provoked trade wars.206
If this is correct, then WTO efforts to undermine the legitimacy of import restrictions to advance
environmental goals may, if partially successful, spark trade wars when they are imposed. The partial
legitimacy that trade restrictions for environmental purposes have enjoyed may have encouraged
countries to acquiesce in improving the environment or just put up with restrictions rather than retaliate.
To the degree that the WTO delegitimizes trade restrictions, it may encourage the object of restrictions

David M. Driesen, The Congressional Role in
International Environmental Law and its Implications for
Statutory Interpretation, 19 BOST. COL. ENVT’L AFF. L. REV. 287,
307 (1991).
202
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to retaliate.207 The WTO could avoid this if it persuades all countries not to use trade restrictions for
coercive purposes, but a partial victory, i.e. persuading the object of trade restrictions of their
illegitimacy while failing to persuade the imposing countries to cease, could be very dangerous to the
WTO's objectives.208
Use of this model to isolate the coercive from the discriminatory in defining free trade reveals a
very fundamental problem with WTO legitimacy in this area. The economic rationale for opposing nondiscriminatory coercion is very muddled indeed.209 Neoclassical economics, after all, concerns itself
with consumer welfare, not with the preoccupations of sovereign states about costs an international
accord or a foreign nation imposes upon its producers.210 There is no reason to expect the WTO to be
superior to a democratic government in deciding what costs its consumers should pay to improve the
environment.211
See Charnovitz, supra note 113, at 10580 (encouraging
countries to resist environmental trade measures will prove
counterproductive).
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A trade panel’s decisions about international coercion should not enjoy legitimacy. Trade
panelists will almost invariably want to oppose coercion, except where it advances the goals of free
trade (as in enforcement of WTO decisions), but may feel politically constrained from doing so upon
occasion. Hence, their decisions will not appear to reflect a balanced judgment about public welfare.
This does not mean that the arguments trade experts advance have no validity. Some trade
sanctions may be unwise. But even if WTO judgments to advance a non-coercion model are
substantively right, its judgments will frequently appear to reflect a lack of understanding of the
importance of competing objectives and a paranoia about potential threats to unrestrained commerce.
3. Discrimination
The concept of free trade as trade free of discrimination against imports seems very attractive
from a policy standpoint. The conventional economic theory of free trade supports a nondiscrimination principle.212 Indeed, discrimination differentiates protective tariffs from general taxes and
import bans from creation of categories of contraband.
Some will oppose even this limited conception of free trade. For example, workers who fear
that their companies will fire them in order to compete better globally may favor high tariffs and even
import restrictions. But free trade proponents have a response to that. They may claim that most

sense because Congress is more likely to accurately reflect
public preferences and values than administrative agencies).
See Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution,
1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 234-35. Professor Heinzerling argues,
however, that, at least in the presence of a discriminatory
measure producing some benefits, such as an environmental
regulation, one cannot assume that all discriminatory measures
are inefficient. Id. at 235-242.
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workers will be better off under a non-discriminatory principle in the long run, relying upon the theory of
comparative advantage.213 This response may not convince all people at all times, but free traders must
convince people of this to secure any type of free trade.214 Moreover, this response has proved
convincing to a number of national governments, who must consider the interests of both industries that
might wish to export and those that fear foreign competition.
Some environmentalists may object to even this fairly narrow principle. After all, anything that
lowers the price of goods, increases their quantity, and increases international shipping may harm the
environment. But prosperous countries have protected their environments more effectively than less
prosperous governments. So some environmentalist can be persuaded that prosperity improves
environmental protection, as long as free trade is divorced from a laissez-faire agenda (which would
cripple national governmental capacity to protect the environment) or a principle of non-coercion
(which would limit effective international responses to serious threats).215

See e.g. Robert B. Reich, Trade Accords Spread the
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Generally, free traders seem to command fairly high ground when they argue for a nondiscrimination principle. The principle boils down to a demand that national governments treat strangers
as guests rather than trespassers, at least affording them the treatment afforded members of their own
household.
A specialized trade institution seems reasonably well suited to advancing free trade as trade free
from express discrimination. Trade experts probably can recognize when a regulation expressly
discriminates against foreign producers.
Decisions by a trade body about discrimination generally have some legitimacy. When a trade
body states that a regulation discriminates against foreign producers that pronouncement probably
strengthens the political case that something unfair is going on which should stop. A good example of
this comes from the very first decision under the new WTO. A trade panel held EPA’s rule requiring
reformulated gasoline in smog prone regions in the United States contrary to GATT.216 The regulation
expressly discriminated between domestic and foreign refineries. Even though a trade panel held illegal
a vital regulation for combating a very serious health problem, the decision did not incite the kind of
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United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body, 35 I.L.M.
603 (1996); 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.40-.130 (1995). See also George
E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F. 3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
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outcry that the Tuna/Dolphin decisions caused.217 The legitimacy of WTO pronouncements that
address facially discriminatory regulations may help explain the muted response.
The WTO’s international character enhances its qualifications for resolving disputes about
alleged discrimination against foreign producers. It stands as a neutral and may claim to be a kind of
impartial umpire of discrimination claims. In this context, it may stand for fairness to foreign producers
facing discrimination. These producers may not enjoy representation in the national government
imposing discriminatory measures.218 Hence, the WTO performs a function here that seems to make
up for limitations that may impede adequate national decision-making.
Hence, the WTO's legitimacy is at its height when the organization acts pursuant to a nondiscrimination model of free trade. The organization has little legitimacy for advancing laissez-faire and
non-coercion models.
C. Explaining Judicial and Scholarly Efforts to Justify the WTO
Understanding the core features of these three models helps clarify the trade and environment
debate. These models help explain how trade panels seek to legitimate the WTO. Trade panels often
try to justify their decisions in terms of non-discrimination, even when other concerns seem to drive the
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decisions. The panels also regularly disavow laissez-faire goals. This disjunction between the
decisions’ dicta and their actual grounds helps explain why so much disagreement exists about whether
the WTO poses a serious threat to competing values. The three-part model provides an alternative
means of thinking about possible reconciliation between free trade goals and competing non-economic
goals.
1. Judicial Disavowal of Laissez-Faire and Embrace of Anti-Discrimination
I have pointed out that concerns about international coercion best explain the Tuna/Dolphin and
Shrimp/Turtle decisions. Similarly, a perceived need to have national governments affirmatively justify
even non-discriminatory regulation drives the Beef Hormone decision. But these decisions feature
explicit, and not always credible, repudiation of laissez-faire goals and use of strained antidiscrimination arguments.
a. Discrimination Talk in Coercion Cases
The first Tuna/Dolphin panel strained to use anti-discrimination rhetoric to defend its holding.
The Panel held that the MMPA did not constitute a regulation of a product triggering article III's
national treatment obligation.219

Since article III did not apply to the case, the Panel did not need to

address the question of whether the MMPA discriminated against foreign tuna in violation of article III.
Nevertheless, the Panel, in dicta,220 accused the United States of discriminating against Mexican tuna in
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violation of article III.221 It stated the MMPA "provided treatment to tuna . . .from Mexico that was
less favorable than the treatment accorded to like United States tuna . . ."222 In light of the fact that the
United States imposed requirements on its own fleet similar to those it demanded of foreign countries,
this statement seems at least questionable. The Panel justified it by claiming that "Article III:4 . . .
obliges the United States to accord treatment to Mexican tuna no less favorable than that accorded to
United States tuna, whether or not the incidental taking of tuna by Mexican vessels corresponds to that
of United States vessels."223 Thus, the panel converted an apparently non-discriminatory regulation into
a de-jure discriminatory regulation.
At the end of its opinion, the Tuna/Dolphin I Panel added "concluding remarks" returning to
anti-discrimination.224 The Panel emphasized that "a contracting party is free to tax or regulate
imported products and like domestic products as long as its taxes or regulations do not discriminate
against imported products. . ."225 And it admonished the United States stating, " [A] contracting party
may not restrict imports of a product merely because it originates in a country with environmental
policies different from its own."226 These statements suggest that the MMPA was GATT illegal

III.”)[emphasis added].
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because it discriminated against Mexican tuna, when, in fact, the anti-discriminatory rationale only
appears in dicta.
Furthermore, the Panel disclaimed any allegiance to laissez-faire goals. The Panel not only
emphasized parties' freedom to tax or regulate absent discrimination against foreign products, it also
emphasized parties' "freedom to tax or regulate domestic production for environmental purposes."227
But the tuna/dolphin principle that only allows a party to tax or regulate domestically prohibits some
non-discriminatory regulation and requires that any regulation addressing an international problem
effectively discriminate against domestic producers. Extending an even-handed prohibition to both
domestic and foreign producers of a product is precisely what the panel prohibited, at least insofar as
the regulation addresses processes. Nevertheless, the panel evidently judged it politic to disclaim any
allegiance to laissez-faire.
Similarly, the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body strained to find discrimination. The panel report
that the Appellate Body reviewed followed Tuna/Dolphin and held that the ban on shrimp harvested
without turtle excluder devices violated GATT article XI.228 Since the United States did not appeal this
finding, appellate review focused on the issue of whether an article XX exception justified violation of
Article XI's prohibition upon quantitative restrictions.229 The Appellate Body held that this measure
227
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constitutes "unjustifiable discrimination," which disqualifies the measure from enjoying an article XX
defense based on the language in that article’s chapeau. 230
The Appellate Body used several novel arguments to justify this holding. Because the United
States required turtle excluder devices of both its own fleet and foreign fleets as a condition of market
access, it appeared to engage in no discrimination at all against foreigners as a class.231 The Appellate
Body, however, held that the "cumulative effect" of a number of aspects of the turtle conservation
program made this apparently even-handed approach discriminatory. 232
It implied that a failure to discriminate in favor of foreign exporters constituted discrimination
against them. It began by noting that the regime as applied requires exporting countries to adopt
"essentially the same policies and enforcement actions as the United States."233 The Appellate Body
recognizes that "the United States also applies a uniform standard throughout its territory."234 But it
found such rigidity unacceptable in foreign relations.235 The panel suggested that the United States must
allow the sale of shrimp from abroad caught without turtle excluder devices, even though the MMPA
requires forfeiture of domestic shrimp catches made without the devices.
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This kind of argument sounds in anti-coercion. Surely, a call for flexibility suggests an embrace
of a model of international relations based on flexible negotiations alone.
But the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body converted this anti-coercion argument into an argument
that uniform even-handed regulation is generally discriminatory. It found even-handedness
inappropriate, because firm even-handed regulation does not involve considering that "different
conditions . . . may occur" in the exporting country.236 It then stated "that discrimination results not
only" from differential treatment, but also from measures that do "not allow inquiry into the
appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries."237
Nothing in the decision identifies a single condition in any country that makes a program of
installing turtle excluder devices unreasonable outside of the United States.238 In any case, the
Appellate Body converted an argument for flexibility in international relations into a strained argument
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The decision does discuss the financial and
administrative costs of implementing a turtle conservation
program in the course of an argument against different phasein periods for different countries. Id. ¶¶ 173-175. But the
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The argument about costs addresses the phase-in periods,
rather than the justification for a uniform program. At least
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L. Sakmar, Free Trade and Sea Turtles: The International and
Domestic Implications of the Shrimp-Turtles Case, 10 COLO. J.
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 345, 386 (1999). This would suggest that
the requirement is quite reasonable, since sea turtles are
endangered.
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about discrimination.
The Appellate Body also argued that the United States failure to negotiate treaties to protect the
Sea Turtles with some of its trading partners was inappropriate. It found this illegitimate because it
meant that the procedures and policies became unilateral, rather than multilateral.239 This again sounds
like a foreign relations argument based on a conception of free trade as trade free of coercion.
The Appellate Body also converted this coercion argument into a discrimination argument.
Since the United States negotiated turtle protection with some trading partners, but not the appellees,
the Appellate Body stated that the "effect is plainly discriminatory."240 The argument that the United
States discriminated by negotiating with some trading partners and not others is quite plausible. The
Appellate Body could have simply held that the United States must negotiate with all trading partners or
none of them, absent some justification, and focused on discriminatory treatment, rather than
discriminatory effect. Its focus on the “effect” of creating “unilateralism,” however, allowed it to cloak
an argument against unilateralism, a species of coercion, in anti-discrimination garb.241
Having created a need for more individualized (and therefore less transparent) bureaucratic
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The Appellate Body also plausibly argued that the
differential treatment- negotiating with some countries, but
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decisions by rejecting uniform standards, the Appellate Body argued for a kind of due process of
international relations.242 It criticized the administrative process of certifying turtle conservation
programs for the failure to provide a hearing, an opportunity for rebuttal, or a reasoned decision. 243
The Appellate Body converted this argument for due process in international relations into a
discrimination argument. It claimed that because of the lack of procedural protections, the United
States discriminates against applicants who do not receive certification "vis-a-vis those . . who are
granted certification."244 But the Appellate Body did not claim that the countries who received
certificates of compliance with U.S. regulations received the procedural protections denied the
unsuccessful applicants. The successful applicants may simply have had a better case on the merits,
because they were willing to use turtle excluder devices. Nothing in the Appellate Body's decision
directly argues to the contrary. Hence, the discrimination argument appears strained.
The Shrimp/Turtle decision, like the Tuna/Dolphin decision, closes with disavowal of the
laissez-faire definition of free trade. The Appellate Body claimed that WTO members may adopt
effective measures to protect endangered species.245 But, says the WTO, the United States has
applied this ban on shrimp caught without turtle excluder devices in an unjustifiably discriminatory
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manner.246
As explained previously, the heart of this line of decisions has nothing to do with antidiscrimination. The Tuna/Dolphin Panel concluded that import bans that any country can escape by
simply adopting the environmental practices of the importing state constitute prohibited quantitative
restrictions, rather than regulations, under GATT. That conclusion rested almost entirely upon an anticoercion rationale. Notwithstanding the Shrimp/Turtle decision’s extended non-discrimination
argument, the Appellate Body singled out the coercive nature of the shrimp ban as the turtle protection
program’s most egregious feature.247
b. Discrimination Talk in Laissez-Faire Cases
The Beef Hormone Panel also characterized a seemingly neutral regulation as discriminatory.
The European Union applied its ban on growth hormones to both European and foreign beef
producers.248 So, once again, the regulation seems quite neutral.
The Panel held that the measures at issue were invalid because they were not based on a risk
assessment, rendering consideration of any discrimination issue unnecessary.249 Yet, the Panel held that
the European Community discriminated by banning beef from cattle fed with growth enhancing
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hormones, while not regulating naturally occurring hormones.250 It also held that the ban on hormones
in beef discriminated, because it did not apply to a different substance used in swine production.251
The Appellate Body reversed, finding the failure to regulate natural hormones justified and
holding that the discrimination based on differential treatment of substances used in swine production
did not constitute a "disguised restriction on international trade."252 While WTO panels frequently shoehorn their rulings into findings of discrimination, the Appellate Body largely resisted the urge to do so
here. The Panel decision, however, conformed to the tendency to seek out anti-discrimination
rationales.
The Beef/Hormone Panel decision also illustrates the impulse to disclaim any movement toward
laissez-faire free trade. The Panel, after holding illegal a regulation of carcinogenic substances for lack
of an adequate scientific basis, tried to claim that it had made no judgment about the necessity of the
measure, but couldn’t. It stressed that "it was not our task to examine generally the . . . necessity" of
the ban on growth hormones in beef.253 In the same paragraph, however, it acknowledged that it had
made a judgment about "the necessity of the import ban. . . for the protection of human life and
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health."254 It then tried to suggest that its ruling somehow left governments free to regulate
domestically, as if a regular participant in international markets could generally regulate without affecting
international trade. It stated that the ability of countries to regulate without affecting international trade
"was not at issue in the present case."255 It then feebly pointed out that it had not addressed non-health
related consumer concerns, thereby implying that it had left a field of regulation untouched.256 In this
way, the Panel tried to draw attention away from the large swath of health-related regulations that its
decision potentially implicated.
The Appellate Body may have recognized the futility of the Panel's efforts to make the
implications of its holding appear insubstantial. It narrowed the Panel's legal reasoning, left its ruling in
tact, and dispensed with concluding remarks.257
This combination of holdings based on non-coercion and laissez-faire related principles with
rhetoric based on discrimination may help explain why observers disagree about whether the WTO
poses a significant threat to environmental protection. Environmentalists may look at the logical
implications of the principles directly supporting the holdings and see a grave threat. Defenders of free
trade may take the limiting dicta in these cases very seriously, partly out of faith in the judgment of trade
panelists.258
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2. Refocusing the Trade and Environment Debate
Scholarly debates about tensions between free trade and competing policies generally treat the
concept and scope of free trade as a given. 259 The debate then focuses upon what exceptions to free
trade GATT should tolerate in order to accommodate the competing policy. 260
In the legal academy, much of this debate takes the form of arguments about the appropriate
scope and interpretation of article XX exceptions to GATT trade disciplines.261 The Tuna/Dolphin case
sparked a debate about whether national regulation of the processes of foreign production was
appropriate.262 But much of the scholarship views this process/product distinction debate as another
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question about exceptions to free trade.263
The three part model calls into question conventional structure of the trade and environment
debate. From a legal perspective, it is not clear why the debate should be about exceptions to free
trade. After all, if the WTO embraces a concept of free trade as trade free from discrimination, as is
sometimes claimed, then we need a debate about expansion of the free trade concept beyond those
bounds. The debate would be a debate about the browning, not the greening, of the GATT. 264
Furthermore, article XX defenses simply do not apply to the most demanding trade disciplines in the
regime, those found in the SPS agreement.
Surely the SPS agreement shows that WTO is administering agreements that cumulatively move
far beyond the problem of discrimination. The model leads us to ask what concept of free trade the
WTO implements.
Asking this question leads to some fresh questioning of the nature of the GATT trade
disciplines. One might ask why precisely the MMPA violates GATT disciplines. This question, which

See e.g. Hudec, supra note 53, at 119 (assuming that
GATT law permits nothing after discussing Tuna/Dolphin); John
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is antecedent to the question of whether a defense applies, turns out to be rather difficult to answer.265
The Tuna/Dolphin panels concluded that the MMPA quantitatively restricts trade.266 GATT
article XI generally forbids quantitative restriction of trade.267
Tuna/Dolphin I offers no direct support for the conclusion that the MMPA establishes a
quantitative restriction on imports.268 Tuna/Dolphin II states that the "embargoes" constituted
"prohibitions or restrictions" of importation under article XI, "since they banned the import of tuna or
tuna products from any country not meeting certain policy conditions."269 [emphasis added]. Of
course, this implies that a country meeting these policy conditions can export freely to the United States.
Tuna/Dolphin does not explain why a measure which allows any country to choose to export unlimited
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quantities of tuna (by choosing to comply with conservation standards) should be considered a
quantitative restriction on trade.270
The panels held that the MMPA did not involve the kind of regulation GATT “authorizes” in
Article III.271 It stated that the MMPA did not regulate the characteristics of tuna as a product.272
Since article III only addresses regulation of products, the Panels concluded that the MMPA provisions
before them did not constitute a regulation within the meaning of that article. Therefore, the GATT
requirement of national regulatory treatment did not apply.
The Tuna/Dolphin decisions suggest that the MMPA regulates the "process" of catching tuna
and distinguishes process from product regulations.273 Scholars debating these decisions have
exhaustively discussed both the wisdom and legal soundness of this product/process distinction274 and
this article will not revisit that issue. But the argument that this law did not regulate tuna as a product,
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even if correct, does not establish that it constitutes a quantitative restriction.
The conclusion that a law allowing imports provided a country meets policy conditions
quantitatively restricts trade, while having a certain surface plausibility, does not withstand analysis. Any
regulation that applies to imported goods will necessarily prohibit imports in order to enforce the
regulation. If the country could export the goods without compliance with the regulation, it would not
have to obey the regulation. If the targeted country can comply with a regulation and thereby secure
the right to export without any limit to quantity, than clearly a qualitative regulation, not a quantitative
restriction, is at issue. Hence, the fact that the MMPA did not inexorably limit the quantity tuna that
Mexico could export to the United States seems to establish that it did not impose a quantitative
restriction.
GATT scholars, however, consider the holding that these regulations involve a prima facie
violation of article XI as so obviously correct as to require no explanation. While article XI on its face
might support the notion that it only limits literal import quotas (including zero quotas), GATT panels
have traditionally construed article XI much more broadly to invalidate almost any regulation applied at
the border that places a burden on imports.275

See WTO Dispute Settlement Report on IndiaQuantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile
& Industrial Products, April 6, 1999, 1999 WTO DS LEXIS 5
(describing article XI as broad and comprehensive); GATT Panel
Report on European Community Programme of Minimum Import
Prices, Licenses and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed
Fruits and Vegetables, October 18, 1978, GATT B.I.S.D. (25th
Supp.) 68 (January 1979) (invalidating article XI minimum
pricing requirements for tomato concentrate enforced through
import licenses). Cf. GATT Panel Report on United StatesMeasures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 19,
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Tuna/Dolphin’s narrow construction of the note ad article III made the MMPA illegal only
because of broad construction of article XI. This broad construction of article XI goes beyond the
anti-mercantilist limit on quotas necessary to sustain the non-discrimination principle and embraces a
laissez-faire rule (limited by applicable defenses) . Hence, narrow construction of the ad note implies
greater movement toward laissez-faire trade.
An historical view of the three part model suggests a theoretical reason for viewing the trade
and environment debate as a discussion of proposals for exceptions to free trade principles.
Historically, the theory of free trade has often been viewed as a laissez-faire theory. From the
perspective of laissez-faire theory any proposal to allow regulation of the environment looks like a
proposal for an exception to free trade principles, because regulations burden international trade. This
may help explain why, over time, the WTO and GATT have construed article XI so broadly and
defenses so narrowly.
The existence of a background laissez-faire assumption by itself has important implications for
understanding “trade and” debates. Since laissez-faire assumptions have very little normative
attractiveness, any sense that they inform scholarly or dispute settlement panel opinions will make those
opinions less persuasive. This may explain why GATT and WTO panels feel obliged to disclaim pursuit
of laissez-faire goals. Absent, however, convincing identification of a more attractive principle, claims
that the WTO pursues something more limited than the maximum politically feasible move toward
laissez-faire goals will prove unconvincing.
1992,GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) 206, 292 (December
1993)(article III, rather than article XI applies to “internal
measures”).
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Scholars realize that the non-discrimination principle may prove more attractive than a laissezfaire principal. Professors Farber and Hudec write, "Facial discrimination is the most attractive case for
GATT intervention . . ."276 And they understand that thoughtful critics of the GATT regime will be
worried about the SPS agreements' restrictions, which I have described as moving toward laissez-faire.
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The three part model facilitates inquiry into which principles actually explain the decisions and
why laissez-faire and non-coercion principles appear more troubling than facial anti-discrimination
principles. The legitimacy analysis already provided partially explains why laissez-faire and anticoercion principles appear more troubling than facial non-discrimination principles. WTO decisions
relying on non-discrimination appear more legitimate than decisions on other grounds. Nondiscrimination seems rooted in fairness concerns and usually involves policy choices that an international
trade institution is well placed to make. By contrast, the WTO lacks the democratic credentials and
expertise to determine the appropriate degree of laissez-faire government. Similarly, trade experts
seem poorly positioned to make decisions about the appropriate use of coercion. While some
international control of coercion may be legitimate, trade experts will have a tendency to view fairly
trivial coercion as a grave threat, even when it effectively serves ends deemed important by the
government of the consumers paying the coercion’s direct cost.
While legitimacy matters, functional considerations matter as well. If a WTO panel holds a law
illegal under laissez-faire principles, the law might not recover. Of course, the WTO has only moved
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toward laissez-faire, not all the way to it. But requiring a nation to invalidate a law because it lacks an
adequate scientific justification may have equally fatal consequences. If WTO judgments about the
adequacy of a scientific judgment follow national consideration of the most important available
evidence, then a compliant government must adopt weaker standards or eschew regulating the matter
giving rise to the WTO judgment. Of course, to the extent a WTO ruling under the SPS agreement
follows significant oversights in examining available data, then the government may find itself able to
regulate after improving the risk assessment. But that may be insufficient if the WTO demands greater
certainty than the available data offers on the issue a national government wishes to regulate.
A non-coercion principle would endanger efforts to protect public health and the environment.
Indeed, a pure anti-coercion principle, as I have shown, is very similar to a laissez-faire policy, since
even-handed regulations and taxes coerce those exporting into the taxing and regulating jurisdiction. A
pure non-coercion principle would abolish a great swath of public health regulation.
A less radical principal, embraced by Tuna/Dolphin II, objects to coercion of national
governments. Tuna/Dolphin II may implicitly distinguish regulations that coerce national governments
from regulations that coerce private companies.278
A rule against coercion of foreign governments would invalidate the use of trade restrictions to
force governments to police impacts of their nationals on the high seas or on global environmental
problems.279 Since all international environmental law relies upon domestic enforcement, this might

278

See Hudec, supra note 14, at 119.
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Daniel Esty refers to measures trying to "change
environmental behavior outside the territory of the party
using the trade sanctions" as offensive measures. Id.
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have serious impacts upon international environmental protection. And international environmental
protection is essential to a nation’s ability to protect its own people from environmental harms as well as
to the protection of other species.
If the WTO extends this non-coercion principle beyond the international environmental context
in which it arose, such a principle could eviscerate domestic environmental law. A country, for
example, might wish to assure that a product consumed in its jurisdiction does not poison its inhabitants.
In order to make a regulation banning this poison’s use effective in a globally integrated world, it must
apply to imports and domestically produced goods alike. If the importing countries cannot effectively
enforce such a regulation through inspections after the product is made, it may have to regulate the
foreign manufacturing process.280 A broad non-coercion rule might prevent it from conditioning access
to its market upon a country supplying adequate data or enforcing the standards that the national
government imposed upon its own manufacturers. Hence, this non-coercion rule would prevent
regulators from effectively implementing domestic measures that required some compliance verification
abroad.281
See Charnovitz, supra note 113, at 10573 n. 73
(inspectors often examine processing methods because food
testing for purity at the border is impractical); Final Rule:
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Baseline Requirements
for Gasoline Produced By Foreign Refiners, 62 Fed. Reg.
45,533, 539-541, 550-559 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80)
(requiring provision of various data and segregation of
reformulated gasoline from foreign companies exporting
gasoline to the United States) .
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Daniel Esty seems to consider such measures a
defensive environmental trade measure. See Daniel C. Esty,
Unpacking the "Trade and Environment" Conflict, 25 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 1259, 1263 (1994). He uses pesticide residue
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Measures conditioning access to domestic markets upon foreign governmental compliance with
national standards have been part of domestic public health laws since the 1920s.282 For example, the
U.S. Import Milk Act of 1927 seeks to assure a pure milk supply by requiring a sanitary inspection of
the foreign dairy farm as a condition of importation.283 Similarly, the United States Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic, Act of 1938 prohibits commerce in food prepared, packed or held under unsanitary
conditions and the U.S. Poultry Products Inspection Act bars importation of poultry unless "subject to
the same inspection . . . standards" as apply in the United States.284 Hence, a rule against coercing
foreign governments would invalidate a lot of standard domestic regulation.
A pure rule against explicit discrimination, however, would only rarely have terribly significant
environmental impacts. The country would usually be able to regulate equally effectively by simply
applying the same standard it applied to imports to its own products.

standards and restrictions on beef imports containing growth
hormone as examples. Id. He states that the purpose of these
defensive measures is to "ensure that imported products meet
the same environmental standards as domestic producers." Id.
His definition of defensive trade measures, however, does
not fit his examples or mine. He states that such measures
"are employed by one country to change the behavior of another
within the territorial confines of the country employing the
trade measure. . ." But limitations on pesticide residues and
hormone treated beef must change the exporting countries'
behavior in its own territory, where it manufactures the
product.
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An example of this comes from the Reformulated Gasoline case.285 The United States could
regulate as stringently after the WTO ruling against its reformulated gasoline rule by extending to foreign
manufacturers the same opportunities for using measurement techniques that domestic manufacturers
had. It subsequently modified its rule to do that.286
In short, a facial non-discrimination requirement usually allows the country suffering WTO
reversal to continue effectively addressing the public health or environmental problem at issue.
Declaring measures illegal on laissez-faire or anti-coercion grounds poses considerably deeper
problems for environmental regulation.
A proposal to focus exclusively upon free trade as trade free of discrimination merits
consideration. Such a proposal would clearly enhance the WTO's legitimacy. It does, however, entail
some reduction in the scope of international trade law.
The models of the definitions of free trade help clarify what is at stake in choosing such a
narrowing for the sake of legitimacy. Such a narrowing implies a particular agenda for the WTO. The
analysis above suggested that a non-discrimination model would involve focusing WTO's institutional
energy upon tariff reduction, elimination of regulations and taxes that expressly discriminate, elimination
of quotas, and curbing domestic subsidies. This would leave the WTO with an ambitious agenda. On
the other hand, it implies leaving efforts to decrease reliance upon non-discriminatory coercion to

See WTO Report of the Appellate Body on United StatesStandards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35
I.L.M. 603 (1996).
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See George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F. 3d 616, 619
(D.C. Cir. 1998), amended, 164 F.3d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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achieve international policy goals and to weaken taxes and regulations off of the WTO agenda.
Analysts who wish to consider such a proposal should consider not just the desirability of the
various objectives (or variants thereof), but also their suitability for pursuit by the WTO. The possible
advantages of a sharper sense of institutional priorities and focus should form part of the analysis.
The focus on the definition of free trade invites critical thinking about GATT and SPS trade
disciplines, not just the exceptions to the disciplines.287 In particular, careful analysis of the role of
coercion in regulation raises questions about the whether a process standard should constitute a
quantitative restriction of trade in violation of article XI. This calls into question the United States’
decision not to challenge Tuna/Dolphin I's conclusion that process standards constitute quantitative
trade restrictions in Tuna/Dolphin II or in Shrimp/Turtle.288 It also shows the inadequacy of a definition
of free trade based as trade free of "trade restrictions" or "trade barriers." Whether or not the reader
accepts the concept I offer in the next section, I hope this article serves to make clear the importance of
defining free trade as a legal concept.

III. Refining and Evaluating the Non-Discrimination Model
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The scholarly debate has included some consideration
of redefining GATT disciplines. See e.g. Schoenbaum, supra
note 23, at 288-90 (discussing proposals to change definitions
of "like products" under article III). But larger concepts of
free trade have played little role in this debate.
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91

The term discrimination does not define itself.289 I have already suggested that WTO decisions
frequently employ the term in an elastic fashion, applying anti-discrimination rhetoric to justify decisions
really reached on other grounds. This sort of use of the non-discrimination idea may deprive the concept
of the legitimacy it might otherwise enjoy. WTO can explicitly adopt a non-discriminatory model and yet
lose the legitimacy such a model might otherwise provide, if it applies it wantonly.
Professor Robert Hudec has written that the WTO depends upon "objective legal rulings"
tending to "elicit community pressure for compliance."290 Legal rulings that appear ad hoc seem unlikely
to be "objective legal rulings" and therefore may attract community pressure for non-compliance. This
part seeks to address this problem in the WTO's application of the discrimination concept.
This part will explore the implications of focusing exclusively upon discrimination and develop a
more precise definition of discrimination as a means of stimulating further discussion of what free trade
should be. First, this part will explain that the WTO has used anti-discrimination rhetoric haphazardly
and failed to develop a coherent definition of discrimination, but that it could change its approach without
amending GATT. Second, this part will develop a definition of discrimination designed to confine the
WTO to institutionally appropriate judgments, called "bright-line" discrimination. Third, it will discuss
some of the advantages and disadvantages of narrowing the WTO’s function as I have described.
This part has the modest goal of stimulating a dialogue about what exactly free trade should be.
The basic models that I have posited so far may help illuminate some fundamental problems with free
Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice
Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L. J.
219, 224 (1957).
289
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92

trade and its relationship to other areas of law and policy. But some of the legitimacy problems stem
from loose use of discrimination talk.291 I do not hope to convince the reader that I have the answer to
the question what free trade should be. But I do hope this section shows that we need to address this
question more explicitly then we have so far.
A. Abandoning the Ad Hoc Approach
Focusing the WTO upon discrimination would not require an amendment of GATT. It would
require an abandonment of several questionable interpretations of GATT and a recognition of
appropriate limits to the global integration tasks an international organization devoted to free trade can
legitimately accomplish. The guiding principles would entail recognizing the WTO should not seek to
determine limits upon non-discriminatory national or international regulation. Rather, the WTO should
leave these tasks to national governments or other international institutions.
A focus upon discrimination would entail abandonment of WTO oversight of neutral regulations
with questionable scientific basis. In particular, the WTO would have to abandon the approach of the
SPS agreement, which makes non-discriminatory regulation illegal, if a dispute resolution panel finds
nation’s scientific justifications for regulation inadequate or concludes that less trade restrictive means
could accomplish a nation’s regulatory goal.
It would also entail abandonment of the anti-coercion approach followed in the two
Tuna/Dolphin cases. General hostility toward coercion would play no part in the evaluation of the
See Snape & Lefkowitz, supra note 262, at 790 (calling
Tuna/Dolphin Panel's assertion that restrictions favoring
foreign fleets discriminated against Mexico confusing and
suggesting a goal of quicky cheap production explains
decision).
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GATT consistency of a measure. Rather, the inquiry would focus upon whether the questioned law
applied the same standards to domestic and foreign producers. If it did, it would be upheld.
The WTO, however, has debased the discrimination concept. In Reformulated Gasoline, the
WTO held, straightforwardly enough, that application of different standards to foreign refiners
constituted discrimination.292 Shrimp/Turtle, however, held that application of the same standard to
domestic and foreign producers constituted discrimination.293 Together the rejection of uniform and
different standards could imply that practically all law discriminates against foreign commerce.
Shrimp/Turtle also held that failure to afford certain procedural protections to countries constituted
"discrimination."294 In Beef Hormone, the WTO Panel treated the failure to regulation of growth
hormones in cattle as discriminatory because of underbreadth, specifically, a failure to regulate different
substances in swine.295
These decisions articulate no coherent and consistent definition of discrimination. Rather, they
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feature an ad hoc approach. 296 The Panels typically identify some feature of the regulation that bothers
them, and then try to make it into discrimination. Even assuming that each argument about discrimination
is plausible (a difficult assumption to sustain), the jurisprudence as a whole appears arbitrary. Moreover,
as I have demonstrated, many of the arguments offered under the anti-discrimination rubric really involve
anti-coercion or laissez-faire moves.
Clearly, a definition of free trade based on anti-discrimination will only help legitimize WTO
decisions if it has a coherent and fairly consistent meaning. Using the term to cover a multitude of sins
will only undermine the legitimacy of the anti-discrimination model.
B. Bright-Line Discrimination
I wish now to highlight a possible approach to discrimination. I do not argue that this approach
is the only possible answer to the dilemma of what free trade should be, but wish, instead, to suggest that
a fairly coherent principle is possible. Articulating a coherent principle highlights the lack of an
acceptable definition of free trade under the existing regime. On the other hand, analyzing the bright-line
approach suggests that an important trade-off exists between coherence and breadth.
Explicit discrimination is usually not difficult to discern. It involves, for example, regulations that
establish one set of requirements for domestic producers and another for foreign producers. While there
are occasions when such regulations may be justified and should be upheld under GATT,297 the WTO
enjoys a fair amount of credibility when it focuses on express discrimination.
See UNEP Criticism, supra note 24 (UNEP claims that
uncertainty concerning trade rules has hampered development of
multilateral environmental treaties).
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The WTO generally does not confine itself to explicit discrimination, because of concerns that
even-handed standards can create disparate impacts. A legitimacy problem, however, comes from this
expansion. In principle, if one expands the concept of discrimination to include regulations that apply the
same requirements to foreign and domestic producers, but have a different effect upon foreign
producers, one can in theory hold many regulations illegal. This move, unless carefully circumscribed,
becomes equivalent to assigning pursuit of laissez-faire government to the WTO.
Differential impacts can occur regularly without any protectionist motive. In order to see why
this is so, assume that two countries have different safety standards for a product. One country, which
we’ll call “Safe”, has strict safety standards and the other country, which we’ll call “Dangerous,” has lax
standards. Once these standards exist, producers in “Safe” will produce a safe product and producers
in “Dangerous” will produce a dangerous product for their domestic markets. Indeed, even if the land of
Dangerous actually contains many producers that meet Safe's standards, substandard producers in
Dangerous may exist. The incremental expense that any foreign substandard producer must incur to
meet the standard can give rise to a disparate impact claim.
If any substandard Dangerous producers try to export their products to Safe, the regulation at
issue will always appear discriminatory in effect. “Safe” must apply its product standards to imports as
well as domestically produced goods in order to adequately protect Safe citizens from its dangers.
This routine application of a standard may appear discriminatory to a trade panel for the
following reasons. First, given current methods of production, Safe’s law will ban the import of some
products from dangerous, because sales of Dangerous' product would violate regulatory standards.
Otherwise, we would have a standard that discriminated against domestic production (or an unenforced
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law). One may also characterize it as a regulation with discriminatory effect, because the regulations
keep Dangerous producers out of the “Safe” market.
Viewed from another perspective, however, Safe’s law imposes a non-discriminatory burden.
As long as Safe applies the same law to Dangerous as it does to itself, the burden consists of the same
burden domestic producers face, the burden of complying with Safe’s standards. Because Safe
producers have experience with Safe production this compliance may be easier for them. But this does
not amount to discrimination, this is simply the inevitable result of a world of varying health and
environmental standards. Normally, Dangerous producers can escape the "trade restraint" by changing
production methods.
An approach that treats laws with differential burdens but formally identical standards as
discriminatory creates legitimacy problems. Absent success in articulating clear coherent tests, such an
approach treats substantially all relatively stringent health and environmental measures as legally suspect
trade restrictions.298
One can construct some bright line rules that ferret out a handful of situations where non-facially
discriminatory regulations actually prevent (rather than just burden) international trade. The principle rule
would state that regulations that make compliance by foreign manufacturers theoretically impossible may
constitute discrimination. For example, a regulation that requires that the workers in Safe manufacture a

See generally Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on
National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and Effects” Test, 32
INT’L LAWYER 619, 639 (1998) (a disproportionate burden on
foreign interests may reflect “random distribution of
unintended effects” unlikely to normatively justify a WTO
invalidation of regulations).
298
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product makes it physically impossible for Dangerous workers to produce products for Safe’s
market.299 Similarly, a regulation that required that an item be produced outdoors in climactic conditions
that do not exist in any country other than Safe effectively prohibits imports from Dangerous. These
regulations discriminate, even though they facially apply the same requirements to all producers. I will
use the term "bright-line" discrimination to describe that test I suggest, a test that focuses upon express
discrimination (different standards for foreign and domestic goods) and those relatively few situations
where a regulation imposes a prerequisite upon imports that makes it theoretically impossible for a
foreign manufacturer to comply.
One might rationalize the Tuna/Dolphin decisions under such a test, albeit on very different
grounds than those the panels emphasized. The Tuna/Dolphin I Panel expressed concern about whether
the MMPA required the Mexican fleet to meet "a retroactive and varying ceiling" based upon the U.S.
fleet's actual dolphin take.300 This problem raises an issue under the "bright-line" test. If the Mexican
government could not tell what numerical limit applied to its fleet's operations in a timely manner, this
would raise an issue about whether compliance with the regulatory condition was possible. If
compliance was possible for the U.S. fleet, but impossible for the Mexican, this would violate the bright
line test, even though the standards applicable to Mexico on their face were less stringent.301

See e.g. Indonesia -Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry, July 2, 1998, 1998 WL 375971 (settling
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The bright line approach is consistent with GATT's text. Article III only guarantees foreign
products "treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin."302 This
phrase certainly can accommodate an interpretation that only requires facially neutral regulations and
regulations that do not make compliance theoretically impossible for foreigners certainly.
GATT panels have traditionally not employed the approach I have suggested under article III.303
Paragraph 1 of article III supports, but does not require a broader approach. This paragraph states
that the "contracting parties recognize that" regulations and taxes "should not be applied . . . so as to
afford protection to domestic production."304 Certainly, this makes burdens analysis textually plausible.
I simply point out that the approach I suggest here is also textually plausible. Paragraph 1 of
article III only speaks of what parties recognize and does not, by its terms, necessarily create a legal rule
against "protectionism." Moreover, a bright line anti-discrimination rule would get rid of rules that
effectively protected domestic industry anyway, in most cases.
Adoption of the bright-line test would require abandonment of the incorrect claim that process
regulations that can be complied with impose quantitative restrictions on trade just because they prohibit
the sale of non-complying goods. Prohibitions of the importation of goods produced in violation of a
country’s standards do not discriminate, provided that a parallel restriction applies to domestic and
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See Jackson, supra note 14, at 1236-1237 (stating
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foreign producers.
Article XI can be read to support this conclusion. Article XI's title refers to "General Elimination
of Quantitative Restrictions." This suggests that article XI refers to quantitative restrictions, not
qualitative restrictions. Furthermore, article XI uses quotas and import or export licenses as the chief
examples of restrictions it prohibits. This again suggests that Article XI does not embrace regulations,
but only limits on the quantity of imports or exports. Under this analysis, article XI’s prohibition of
restriction through “other measures” should take its meaning from the surrounding references to quotas
and licenses, prohibiting measures, such as “voluntary” limits on quantities of exports, that directly
impose quantitative limits without resort to licences and quotas.
GATT panels have traditionally interpreted article XI much more broadly, reading the reference
to “other measures” broadly to include almost any burden on goods .305 This comprehensive
interpretation, while textually justifiable, is not the only plausible interpretation.306
The bright-line approach, however, is not a panacea. It entails restricting the scope of "free
trade" in order to find a coherent principle and enhanced legitimacy.
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Article XI’s title refers to quantitative
restrictions. This supports the quantitative/qualitative
distinction I have suggested. GATT, supra note 1, art. XI.
The text bans “prohibitions or restrictions. . . whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other
measures.” Id. In the context of the title’s reference to
abolishing quantitative restrictions, this could plausibly
refer to complete refusals to allow imports and numerical
limitations on the quantity of imports, however enforced at
the border, but not to qualitative restrictions that do not
inexorably limit the quantity of imports.
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Legal precedent and scholarly commentary support the notion of confining the reach of a body’s
political authority in order to avoid having it make decisions that would tend to sap its legitimacy.307 For
example, the United States Supreme Court generally has authority to pass upon the constitutionality of
governmental actions. But the Court construes that authority narrowly to avoid resolution of genuine
constitutional questions that seem to require a political, rather than a purely legal judgment. Hence, the
Supreme Court refuses to decide whether a state’s governmental structure conforms with the
constitutional requirement for a Republican form of government.308 The Supreme Court also refrains
from deciding many crucial questions about the scope of the President’s foreign affairs power under the
constitution.309 Conceptually, one might think of this as a narrowing of the definition of constitutional law
for purposes of judicial review, analogous to a narrowing of the definition of free trade for purposes of
See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1212 (1978).
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political question); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How. 635, 65758 (1853) (recognition of new governments and termination of
treaties held non-justiciable political questions); The Three
Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1897) (determination of insurgency
held a political question); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black)
635, 667, 669-70 (1862) (determination of belligerency held a
political question); The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700,
701-02 (1871) (determination of existence of a state of war
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Oliver P. Field, The Doctrine of
Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 Minn. L. Rev.
485, 512 (1924).
See also Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30
(1945) (holding that State Department, not federal court,
decides upon existence of foreign sovereign immunity).
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WTO review.
Similarly, Congress sometimes restricts the authority of federal agencies to fully realize legislative
goals, in order to avoid federal intrusion upon legitimate state and local decision-making. For example,
the Clean Air Act limits EPA’s authority to require states to implement certain types of measures aimed
at reducing car use, even in the event of state failure to meet its obligation to protect public health.310 An
analogous principle might prevent the WTO from expanding disciplines protecting free trade in ways that
involve inappropriate intrusions on national authority.
This argument does not establish what the bounds of WTO administered free trade should be.
But it does support the notion that an objection to a narrowing of grounds based on solely on its failure
to correct some objectionable actions does not suffice. Rather, a justification for an expansion of WTO
authority must have a theory as to why the WTO, rather than national governments or a more neutral
international body, should make the sorts of judgments involved in an expansion of the WTO’s authority.
Such a justification will be very difficult with respect to the SPS agreement and other moves toward
laissez-faire principles.
C. Failure to Root out All Protectionism
I anticipate the following response, to the bright line test: A narrowly circumscribed antidiscrimination principle will fail to root out “protectionist” trade barriers.311 I show below why this
argument proves unsatisfactory. Ultimately, this response simply fails to grapple with the question of
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what free trade should be in a world that has some objectives, such as protection of public health and
the environment, that sometimes require burdens upon commerce. In such a world, anti-protectionism
does not offer a satisfactory definition of free trade.
1. Anti-Protectionism: An Unsatisfactory Legal Concept
A suggestion that WTO dispute settlement panels should eliminate protectionism must have a
premise that anti-protectionism functions as a satisfactory legal concept to guide WTO decisions. But
elimination of "protectionism" cannot serve as an adequate legal principle to govern international trade
law, because the concept has no specific agreed meaning. 312 Melvin Krause has defined the “new
protectionism” broadly as referring to all government intervention that affects foreign trade.313 This
laissez-faire view would make almost all regulation protectionist. Professor Sykes defines all regulation
disadvantaging a foreign party without providing the least trade restrictive means of meeting a regulatory
objective as protectionist.314 Professor Regan defines as protectionist laws passed with a protectionist
motive that are analogous to tariffs, quotas, or embargoes.315 Since the term has no many possible
meanings, the concept provides no solution to the problem of the ambiguous definition of free trade.
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Accord ROBERT KUTTNER, THE END OF LAISSEZ FAIRE: NATIONAL
PURPOSE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AFTER THE COLD WAR 114 (1991) ("free
traders have no good working definition of . . .
protectionism," except in the extreme case).
313

AND

See MELVYN B. KRAUSE, THE NEW PROTECTIONISM: THE WELFARE STATE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 36 (1978).

Sykes, supra note 11, at 3-5 (setting out Professor
Sykes’ personal definition of protectionism, rather than a
generally recognized definition).
314

315

Regan, supra note 7, 1094-96.
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Nevertheless, elimination of protectionism, whatever it is, seems like a central goal of free trade
law. Free-traders may feel that vigorous routing out of this undefined evil constitutes a morally satisfying
exercise, because free-traders believe that acceptance of the theory of comparative advantage will
advance human welfare (and they may well be right in general). Those who do not believe in this theory,
therefore, have committed heresy, and their work should be rooted out.
This does not, however, mean that protectionism functions as an analytically useful concept in
adjudicating cases. In order to do that, the terms must have some specific meaning that correlates with
sound decision-making and an acceptable definition of free trade.
a. Discriminatory Motive
One might define protectionist measures as those enacted with the intent to economically benefit
domestic concerns by discouraging foreign competition. This definition would make the legality of a
measure hinge on the subjective motivations a trade panel attributes to decision-making bodies, such as
national legislatures.
The literature raises a number of fundamental objections to motive review generally. First,
ascertaining the motivations of legislatures may prove difficult or impossible.316 Second, the inquiry may

See e.g. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 38384 (1968); John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205, 1212-14,
1279 (1970)(discovering motivation is very difficult, but at
times appropriate and possible in constitutional litigation);
Winkfield F. Twyman, Beyond Purpose: Addressing State
Discrimination in Interstate Commerce, 46 S.C.L. Rev. 381,
426-27 (1995) (general rule of not inquiring into legislators'
motives keeps the Court out of problematic inquiries).
316
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be unseemly.317 Some commentators, however, do not find these objection persuasive.318
More fundamentally, the inquiry yields nothing useful in trying to advance public welfare.319 A
measure that was intended to protect a domestic industry may have a very desirable effect on public
welfare and may fail in its objective of protectionism.
This problem becomes especially acute when one consider mixed motives.320 Suppose that a
country has failed to adequately address a serious long-term environmental problem because it fears
needed regulation's immediate impact upon its own producers. Suppose that a bill to address this
problem passes, because of mixed motives. Producers of a cleaner competing product and
environmentalists support the bill. If this bill is even-handed it may burden foreign producers of the
See e.g. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959)
(Brennan J. dissenting); Kenneth L. Kart, The Costs of MotiveCentered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1164 (1978)(the
courts have long regarded inquiries into motive as unseemly);
Twyman, supra note 316, at 426-27 (general rule of not
inquiring into legislators' motives keeps the Court out of
inquiry into personal motives).
317

See e.g. Regan, supra note 7, at 1143-1160; Paul
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Motivation, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 119-127
(justifying inquiry into motivation in equal protection
cases).
318

319

This is a species of a more general argument about
motivation, that invalidating an otherwise valid law on the
basis of motivation does not enhance utility. See Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV.
341, 360 (1949)
See generally Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 119-20 (disapproving of searching
for predominate motives in mixed motive cases); Ely, supra
note 316, at 1213-14, 1266-68 (same).
320
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environmentally destructive product as well as domestic producers. A free-trader may well look at this
situation and view the legislation as protective of the domestic industry producing the substitute.
Outside of free trade circles this protectionist objection, while plausible, enjoys little legitimacy as
a reason to disallow the law. The protection argument amounts to an assertion that environmentalists
should never work cooperatively with industry who may benefit financially from environmental protection
or that politicians should not consider the commercial upside to environmental regulation.321 But some
analysts have posited that increasing economic integration has weakened the state's capacity to further
public welfare.322 If this is true, than environmental protection may need to rely in part upon the political
power of industries that might benefit from environmental protection.323 As long as the regulation is
even-handed and non-discriminatory, a protectionist motive for its passage will not necessarily make the
regulation harm public welfare. If this law harms public welfare, this will be because of its content, not its
motivation.324
Approaching mixed motive cases like a blood hound sniffing out improper "protectionist" motives
will surely weaken the WTO's legitimacy in the eyes of national governments. The legislators will tend to
See generally, Driesen, supra note 47, at 568-571
(explaining why environmental regulations may generate
commercial benefits).
321

322

See Benvenisti, supra note 30, at 168, 201.

See generally Chang, supra note 23, at 2205-06
(explaining why protectionist interest group support for trade
measures may overcome the problem of too little environmental
protection predicted by public choice theory).
323

See generally id. at 2174-75 (proposing that trade
restrictions that "in fact offer significant protection"
should be GATT-illegal).
324
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view such a case as involving a solid pragmatic approach to a difficult public problem. The WTO will
do better, it has some solid problem to point to, like bright-line discrimination.325
b. Disparate Impact
Rather than define protectionism according to lawmakers’ motives, one might identify as
protectionist those measures that had disparate impacts i.e. those measures that harmed foreign interests
at the expense of domestic interests.326 Measures creating disparate impacts might fairly be
characterized as not just protectionist in motivation, but as actual trade barriers in practice.
I have already identified several of the numerous problems with this approach. In an
interdependent world just about any tax or regulation will have a disparate impact.327 In theory, strict
standards will often have a worse impact on foreign producers than on domestic ones, since the
domestic producers will usually adapt quickly and fairly completely to strict domestic standards. If a
strict standard advances some legitimate public policy goal, then the measure may be welfare enhancing,
even if the impact is disparate.
In economic theory the question of whether a regulation is welfare enhancing is based upon a

See generally Chang, supra note 23, at 2203 (available
evidence suggests little protectionist abuse of environmental
trade measures).
325

See generally, Twyman, supra note 105 (recommending
such an approach for dormant commerce clause jurisprudence).
326

See Charnovitz, supra note 75, at 1783 (all product
standards have differential impacts on exporting countries,
since each country has a different structure of production).
327
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cost-benefit analysis.328 It has nothing to do with its motivation or disparate effects.
Rooting out protectionism seems divorced from neoclassical economic theory and seems to involve a
desire to dictate ideological acceptance of the theory of comparative advantage as the most important
determinant of public welfare.
Moreover, unless the measure actually applies different standards to foreign competitors, it
usually cannot reliably protect the domestic producer anyway.329 If it applies the same standards to both
domestic and foreign producers, then the targeted foreign producer may comply with the standards set
up to protect the domestic industry. The protection will then fail. An anti-discrimination standard would
seem sufficient to root out the most serious economic problems that protectionism spawns, beyond the
continuation of free trade heresy.
This hopefully explains why the standard objection to a facial discriminatory model does not
suffice. The standard objection holds that officials can "avoid the force of a literal prohibition with
ease."330 Of course they can. The United States can apply onerous taxes and regulations to high end
luxury cars that happen to come predominantly from foreign countries and apply less onerous taxes and

See generally Farber & Hudec, supra note 24, at 1417
(stating that the most logical approach would be engage in
cost-benefit balancing, but that this approach is politically
unacceptable).
328

See e.g. Roberts, supra note 71, at 392 (the European
Community imported the same amount of beef before and after
adoption of the restriction on hormone fed beef).
329

See Winkfield F. Twyman, Losing Face But Gaining
Power: State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 16 VA. TAX. REV.
347, 361 (1997).
330
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regulations to non-luxury cars that the domestic market produces in great number.331 But this scheme
does not protect the domestic market or interfere with free trade in the same manner as a rule that
literally applies one set of regulations and taxes to European automobiles and another to American
automobiles. First of all, if the Europeans make any non-luxury cars at the time of enactment, they will
get the same preferential treatment afforded U.S. manufacturers. Second, even if they do not make nonluxury cars, they can choose to do so and gain the preferential treatment. Third, if the U.S.
manufacturers should try and make luxury cars, they will get the same bad treatment that the Europeans
received. In short, companies can adapt if the burdens of different impacts are really significant to their
trade.332 This adaptation possibility means that evasion of a ban on bright-line discrimination will not
reliably protect domestic industry.
Furthermore, the ability to adapt to differential burdens flowing from neutrally written regulations
raises questions about the traditional justification for broad GATT and WTO review of “non-tariff”
trade barriers. The general logic supporting this review holds that countries can escape the effect of
negotiated tariff reductions by means of non-tariff trade barriers. But tariffs, unlike neutrally framed
regulation, expressly discriminate against foreign commerce. Regulations that do not constitute bright-

See generally Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
United States Taxes on Automobiles, 33 I.L.M. 1397
(1994)(unadopted)
(upholding differential taxation under GATT).
331

See generally Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST. COMM. 395, 413
(1986)(pointing out that the market creates "inexorable"
penalties for burdensome regulation that can sometimes get
states to change the regulations).
332
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line discrimination do not inexorably create a differential burden, because countries can adapt. It follows
that the logic of securing tariff bindings does not fully support differential burdens analysis in the absence
of bright-line discrimination.
I do not intend to suggest that the bright-line approach creates no problems. Indeed, some
regulations that have no legitimate purpose and harm commerce will survive under this approach, and, in
an ideal world they would die. I do wish to suggest that until the WTO can articulate some
institutionally legitimate test that relates clearly to a consistent clear concept of free trade, invalidation of
neutral regulations with uneven effects poses a legitimacy problem for the WTO.333

This argument

against protectionism defined as either tainted by improper motives or causing disparate impacts also
addresses the various fine-grained definitions of protectionism that legal commentators have proposed
from time to time. For example, Professor Donald Regan has proposed a definition of protectionism that
requires a protectionist motive and a restriction analogous to tariffs, quotas, or embargoes.334 This
purposeful discrimination test seems more restrictive than the test I have proposed, because a bright line
discrimination test would presumptively prohibit discriminatory laws, even without a protectionist
motive.335 To the extent Professor Regan proposes to invalidate legislation based on disparate impacts,
See Farber & Hudec, supra note 24, at 1432 (explaining
that GATT suffer problems of legitimacy in making judgments
about the effects of regulation); Snape & Lefkovitz, supra
note 262, at 799-801 (suggesting confusion exists about
definition of "free trade" and leaping to the notion that the
theory of comparative advantage is outdated).
333

334

See Regan, supra note 7, at 1094-95.

335

Regan uses a definition of protectionism that seems to
leave out most regulation. He refers to tariffs, embargoes,
and quotas, all measures that are discriminatory and fall
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my analysis of the problems of a disparate impact test applies.336
Professor Sykes defines protectionism as “any cost disadvantage imposed on foreign firms by a
regulatory policy that discriminates against them or that otherwise disadvantages them in a manner that is
unnecessary to the attainment of some genuine, nonprotectionist regulatory objective.”337 The bright line
discrimination test would reach genuine discrimination, but not regulation “otherwise disadvantaging”
foreign firms. My critique of the problem of outlawing unequal burdens applies to this otherwise
disadvantaging notion. If a law creates a disadvantage without express discrimination, it must be
because of unequal burdens.338
Professor Sykes’ definition, however, only brands as protectionist measures creating unequal

within the ambit of a bright-line discrimination test without
any reference to “protectionism.” See id. at 1115. He then
qualifies his definition by stating that protectionism is
inefficient because it diverts business from foreign producers
without a "colorable justification" deserving societal
approval. Id. at 1118. This suggests that expressly
discriminatory measures would not qualify as protectionist if
the enacting government proffered a colorable justification
worthy of societal approval.
336

Professor Regan’s position on this point is quite
subtle. On the one hand, he insists that purpose rather than
effect is the touchstone of his concept of protectionism. See
id. at 1137 (protectionist purpose is what we really care
about)[emphasis in original]. On the other hand, he treats
something he calls protectionist effect, as possible evidence
of protectionist purpose. Id. at 1136. This might suggest
that disparate impacts can trigger invalidation of a measure
as protectionist.
337

Sykes, supra note 11, at 3.

See id. at 4 (claiming that the European ban on beef
raised with hormones creates is protectionist because of a
cost disadvantage).
338
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burdens that are “unnecessary to the attainment” of regulatory objectives.339 His elaboration of his
necessity requirement proposes a “least restrictive means” test for economic regulation posing differential
burdens for foreign commerce.340 If I am correct that differential burdens will almost always arise under
strict, but even-handed, regulation, then Syke’s protectionism definition implies applying a “least
restrictive means” test to a lot of economic regulation. Such a test poses a high hurdle, because any
good lawyer can imagine a less restrictive means to meet a given end than the one a legislature chooses.
Indeed, the Supreme Court uses this test to help implement the constitutional ban on abridgement of
free speech, 341 but considers it too demanding to apply to neutral laws burdening the free exercise of
religion and content neutral regulation of speech.342 Applying the least restrictive means test to

339

Id. at 3.

340

Id. at 5.

See e.g. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium v. Federal Communications commissions, 518 U.S.
727, 730, 754-55 (1996) (invalidating regulation of indecent
and obscene programming under least restrictive means test);.
341

See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509,
533-534 (1997) (striking down an act protecting freedom of
religion through a least restrictive means test); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (refraining from
applying a least restrictive means test to time, place and
manner restrictions on speech); Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (same). See also
Board of Trustees of the State University of New v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 477-480 (1989)(declining to apply a least
restrictive means test to protect commercial speech). Cf.
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1593-94
(1995)(justifying invalidation of law prohibiting labeling
giving beer’s alcohol content because of the availability of
less intrusive alternatives). The Boerne Court invalidated
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, because it
required state laws burdening the free exercise of religion to
342
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commercial regulation, especially outside the context of facially discriminatory measures, may involve a
substantial move toward a laissez-faire system.343
The existence of legal definitions as disparate as those of Professors Sykes and Regan simply
highlights the lack of any agreement about what the term protectionism means. Professor Syke’s test
offers the promise of coherence. But its adoption poses the same threat to WTO legitimacy as other
laissez-faire moves. And the WTO in its SPS agreement and the Technical Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade has adopted a least restrictive means test that requires no showing of unequal burden
at all.344 This test requires the WTO to judge whether a regulation is needed, and indeed, creates a
strong impetus to conclude that it is not in many cases.
2. Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence as a Model

serve a compelling state interest through the least
restrictive means. The Court explained that this test invites
“searching scrutiny of state laws” protecting public welfare
with the “attendant likelihood of invalidation.” Id. at 507.
The court characterized this test as “the most demanding test
known to constitutional law.” Id. at 534. The court claimed
that the “least restrictive means” test was not part of its
jurisprudence addressing legislation burdening free exercise
of religion. Id. at 534. On the other hand, the Court has
held that a law aimed squarely at the practices of a single
religious sect must be “narrowly tailored to advance” a
compelling state interest. See Smith: Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-532 (1993).
Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349
(1951)(invalidating a facially discriminatory law under the
dormant commerce clause because of the existence of reasonable
alternatives).
343

344

SPS Agreement, ¶5.6; Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade,¶ 2.2, reprinted in URUGUAY RESULTS, supra note 13, at
139.
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The commerce clause of the United States constitution authorizes Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.345 The Supreme Court treats this affirmative grant of power to Congress as authority for
judicial constitutional oversight of state regulation and taxation potentially impeding interstate commerce.
The resulting "dormant commerce clause" jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court
also involves the use of an anti-discrimination principle to advance free trade.346 Daniel Esty has
suggested that United States Supreme Court jurisprudence under the dormant commerce clause
provides an appropriate model for the WTO.347 Professor Esty, however, has not discussed the value,

345

See U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8.

See e.g. Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from
Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax
Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 422-467 (1996);
Regan, supra note 7, at 1093 n.3; Westinghouse Electric Corp.
v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 402 (1984) ("the very purpose of the
Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the
several States."); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S.
Ct. 2205, 2218 n. 21 (1994) (quoting Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)); Associated Indus. of Mo. v.
Lohman, 114 S. Ct. 1815, 1820 (1994); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488
U.S. 252, 265-66 (1989). Justice Souter and several scholars
have dissented from the view that the commerce clause has
promotion of free trade as a central purpose. See Wynkfield
F. Twyman Jr., Losing Face But Gaining Power: State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce, 16 VA. TAX REV. 347, 423-427 (1997)
(free trade not a goal of the framers, not part of the early
jurisprudence); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114
S. Ct. 1677, 1692-1702 (1994) (Souter J.,
dissenting); Rachel D. Baker, C & A Carbone v. Town of
Clarkstown: A Wake-up Call for the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5
DUKE ENV. L. & POL'Y FORUM 67, 84 (1995) (agreeing with Justice
Souter's views in Carbone); Albert S. Abel, The Commerce
Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary
Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941).
346

347

See ESTY, supra note 1, at 113-115.
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success, or coherence of the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. Justice Scalia,
for one, has questioned the court's extension of dormant clause doctrine beyond facially discriminatory
regulation in the sharpest terms, characterizing its "practical results" as a "quagmire" and stating that "our
applications of the doctrine have, not to put too fine a point on the matter, made no sense."348 And
Justice Rehnquist has characterized the court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence as "hopelessly
confused."349 These comments reflect the views of a number of careful students of this area of the law
about the state of the doctrine as applied to non-facial discrimination. 350
This article will not canvass and evaluate all of the reasons for this view. Other commentators
have addressed this matter at length. 351
Professors Farber and Hudec, while emphasizing the existence of relatively easy facially
discriminatory cases, have suggested a reason for the difficulties the Court faces in resolving cases that

348

Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington Dep't of Revenue, 483
U.S. 232, 259-60 (1987) Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
349

Kassel v. Consolidated Freight Corp., 450 U.S. 662,
701 (Rehnquist J. dissenting).
See e.g. Julian Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L. J. 425, 484 (1982); Walter
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business:
Perspectives on Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication,
41 TAX LAW. 37, 44 (1987)(chiding the court for line drawing
"discernible, if it all only to itself" in adjudicating the
constitutionality of state taxes).
350

351

See e.g. infra note 350.
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do not involve facial discrimination352 They have stated that the problem of reconciling free trade and
local interests is not susceptible to bright line tests.353
This statement begs the question of what free trade should be conceptually. If free trade consists
of a laissez-faire concept and a set of ad hoc judgments about when to abandon laissez-faire, then this
statement makes sense. It also makes sense if free trade has no real meaning, but consists of a moral
crusade to root out measures with improper motivations or uneven effects. Indeed, Professors Farber
and Hudec strongly suggest that no matter what legal tests operate, ultimately these decisions involve a
crusade (my term not theirs) against "protectionism."354 But this article questions the idea that WTO
administration of a set of ad hoc exceptions to a laissez-faire principle or a crusade against protectionism
will enjoy little legitimacy or coherence.
Justice Scalia's comment and my analysis here suggest another possibility. One could simply

352

Professors Farber and Hudec state that the messiness
in this area is not the same as chaos. Id. at 1438. They
emphasize that the dormant commerce clause jurisprudence and
GATT deal adequately with "facially discriminatory measures."
They acknowledge that both "run into trouble with facially
neutral measures," but claim that even here there are a
considerable number of easy cases. Id. They do not cite any
of these easy cases, nor do they suggest that this
considerable number predominates. Furthermore, Farber and
Hudec analyze regulatory cases, but do not discuss tax cases
arising under the dormant commerce clause. While this is
understandable, since much of the debate so far has focused on
regulations, the tax area may be even more chaotic than the
regulatory area. See Hellerstein, supra note 350, at 44
(explaining that the degree of incoherence in this area is
unusual). Both are relevant to GATT.
353

See Farber & Hudec, supra note 24, at 1438.

354

See id. at 1437-38.
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define free trade as trade free from bright line discrimination. Then a principle cause for incoherence in
WTO adjudication of discrimination claims would vanish.
I do not suggest that this move would solve all problems of coherence. But it would certainly
help.
It also would ameliorate the WTO's legitimacy problems. The United States Supreme Court
applies balancing tests to regulations that do not facially discriminate.355 As a generalist institution the
Court enjoys some legitimacy in balancing competing policy objectives.356 Professors Farber and
Hudec have correctly pointed out that such balancing is inevitable in addressing non-facial discrimination
claims. But a specialist institution enjoys little legitimacy in performing such balancing.
The search for a definition of free trade suggests that we should not treat the incoherence of
trade law as inevitable. Rather, it signals a problem at the core of the enterprise, the lack of an adequate
concept of what free trade is. As Julian Eule said in a leading article on the dormant commerce clause,

See Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much- An
Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 46 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 47, 58-64 (1981).
355

See Twyman, supra note 330, at 376 (discussing those
who basically approve of the court's balancing). Many
scholars, however, have criticized the Supreme Court's
balancing for a variety of reasons. See id. at 377. The
problem of having to balance "incommensurable" interests
appears even worse when specialists devoted to one of those
interests does the balancing, as occurs at the WTO. Cf. id.
Another problem, the supplanting of political decisions
appears even more egregious when the electorate lacks an
indirect control over the judges, as in the WTO. See
generally, Benvenisti, supra note 110, at 184-196, 200-201.
(discussing the undemocratic nature of international law and
institutions).
356
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"A coherent set of guidelines can only flow from an understanding of purpose."357
Hopefully, the identification of the three models of free trade will help spark a dialogue about the
problem of defining free trade. The WTO may eventually find that accepting some clear limits to the
scope of its enterprise may be a price worth paying to enhance its legitimacy. Whether or not the WTO
should adopt the bright line discrimination test posited here or some other approach, its legitimacy will
depend on whether it can relate its actions to a coherent concept of free trade that a specialized
international institution can credibly administer.
Conclusion
The three part model explains how the departure from a discriminatory model threatens the
WTO's legitimacy. The WTO could substantially reduce this threat by focusing on an anti-discrimination
model and refining its approach to anti-discrimination.
Focusing inquiry upon the definition of free trade provides another way of thinking about "trade
and" issues. It invites more critical thinking about the trade disciplines themselves, rather than just the
scope of exceptions. It also shows that misunderstandings between free traders and environmentalists
have roots in the conflation of concepts of free trade.

357

Eule, supra note 350, at 484.
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Appendix
Agriculture
7 U.S.C. §136j (prohibiting sale of pesticides absent compliance with pesticide registration
requirements)
7 U.S.C. §136o- (authorizing refusal of admission of pesticides violating pesticide control
provision)
7 U.S.C. §150bb(a)- (prohibiting unauthorized movement of plant pests between states and
between foreign countries and the U.S.)
7 U.S.C. § 157- (prohibiting importation of stock absent compliance with package-making
requirements)
7 U.S.C. § 1611 – (prohibiting sale of non-certified seeds)
7 U.S.C. § 2803- (prohibiting movement of unauthorized noxious weed into or through the
U.S.)
Commerce and Trade
15 U.S.C. § 68a (prohibiting introduction of misbranded wool products into commerce)
15 U.S.C. § 68f (prohibiting importation of goods not meeting branding standards and stating
that violators may be prohibited from importing any wool products after the violation)
15 U.S.C. § 69a (prohibiting introduction into commerce of misbranded or deceptively
advertised or invoiced fur)
15 U.S.C. § 69d (prohibiting anyone failing to comply with the labeling requirements for

-i-

imported fur from further importing except upon filing a bond)

15 U.S.C. § 1124 (prohibiting importation of goods bearing marks or names infringing
trademarks)
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (b) (prohibiting admission of misrepresented goods).
15 U.S.C. § 1192 (prohibiting sale of any material not conforming to flammability standards)
15 U.S.C. § 1198 – (prohibiting introduction into interstate commerce of misbranded or
banned hazardous substances)
15 U.S.C. § 1273 (prohibiting admission into U.S. of a hazardous or misbranded substance)
15 U.S.C. § 2066- (prohibiting admission into the United States of products that do not
comply with consumer safety standards, are not properly certified, are not properly labeled, are
deemed imminently hazardous, or have a product defect that constitutes a substantial hazard)
15 U.S.C. § 2068-(prohibits importing or distributing in commerce anything not meeting
specified safety requirements).
Conservation
16 U.S.C. § 703 (prohibiting sale or importation migratory birds).
16 U.S.C. § 705 (prohibiting interstate carrying or importation of migratory birds)
16 U.S.C. § 971e (prohibiting the sale or importation of certain fish)
16 U.S.C. § 1538 (prohibiting the sale in interstate commerce and the importation of
endangered species)
16 U.S.C. § 3372 (prohibiting sale and importation of illegally taken fish and wildlife)
-ii-

16 U.S.C. § 3637-(prohibiting importation or sale of fish taken or retained in violation of
provisions relating to North Atlantic salmon fishing)
Copyrights
17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 503, 602 (providing for impoundment of imported goods reflecting
copyright infringement)
Crimes and Criminal Procedures
18 U.S.C. § 42 (prohibiting importation and interstate shipment of certain animals)
18 U.S.C. § 553 (prohibiting importation of stolen motor vehicles, mobile equipment, or
aircraft)
18 U.S.C. § 2313 (prohibiting interstate sale of stolen vehicles)
18 U.S.C. § 842 (prohibiting importation, transportation, and reception of explosive materials
without a license).
18 U.S.C. § 922- (prohibiting importation or sale of firearms without a license)
18 U.S.C. § 1301 (prohibiting interstate selling and the importation of lottery tickets)
18 U.S.C. § 1462 (prohibiting importation and selling in interstate commerce of obscene
materials)
18 U.S.C. § 1761 (prohibiting the importation and transportation in interstate commerce of
prison-made goods)
Food and Drugs
21 U.S.C. § 331 (prohibiting "the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
Commerce" any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded)
-iii-

21 U.S.C. § 350a(c) (prohibiting introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce new unregistered infant formula).
21 U.S.C. § 355-(prohibiting introduction into commerce, or importation of electronic products
not complying with applicable standards)
21 U.S.C. § 360oo (same, but referring to different standards).
21 U.S.C. § 458 (prohibiting poultry sales absent compliance with inspection and other food
safety requirements).
21 U.S.C. § 460 (generally prohibiting sale or importation of inedible poultry parts absent
compliance with requirements to prevent human consumption)
21 U.S.C. § 466 (prohibiting entry of unhealthy poultry absent compliance with domestic
standards).
21 U.S.C. § 620-(prohibiting sale or importation of adulterated or misbranded meat products).
21 U.S.C. § 641-(prohibiting sale or importation of inedible meat products absent compliance
with requirements designed to prevent human consumption)
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (prohibiting distribution of controlled substances)
21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(9) (prohibiting importation or distribution of certain listed chemicals without
proper registration)
21 U.S.C. § 863 (prohibiting importation or sale of drug paraphernalia)
Public Health and Welfare
42 U.S.C. § 262 (prohibiting introduction into commerce of biological product unless a
biological license is in effect and each package has proper markings)
-iv-

42 U.S.C. § 2077 (prohibiting importation, transfer, or reception of special nuclear material)
42 U.S.C. § 2211 (prohibiting importation, transfer, or reception any atomic weapon)
42 U.S.C. § 5409- (prohibiting sale or importation of mobile homes not complying with
construction and safety standards)
42 U.S.C. § 6301 (refusing admission to products not conforming to energy conservation
standards).
42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(1) (prohibiting importation or offering into commerce any new motor
vehicle or engine not complying with emission and fuel standards)
42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(2)(B) (prohibiting sale of devices interfering with pollution control
systems).
42 U.S.C. § 7545 (prohibiting sale of unregistered or illegal fuels and fuel additives)
Shipping
46 U.S.C. § 4307 (prohibiting sale or importation of recreational vessels absent conformity
with regulatory standards)
Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radio Telegraphs
47 U.S.C. § 302a(b) (prohibiting sale or importation of devices that interfere with radio
reception).
47 U.S.C. § 330 (prohibition of importation or shipping in interstate commerce certain types of
television receivers)
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) (prohibiting sale or importation of equipment decrypting satellite cable
programming)
-v-

Transportation
49 U.S.C. § 30112 (prohibiting importation or sale of motor vehicle or equipment that does not
comply with safety standards)
49 U.S.C. § 33506(a)(1) (prohibiting importation or introduction interstate commerce of
vehicles that do not comply with bumper standards)
49 U.S.C. § 33114(a)(1) (prohibiting importation of introduction into commerce of vehicles
violating theft-prevention standards)

-vi-

